Daily Papers

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

Federated Language Model (FedLM) allows a collaborative learning without sharing raw data, yet it introduces a critical vulnerability, as every untrustworthy client may leak the received functional model instance. Current watermarking schemes for FedLM often require white-box access and client-side cooperation, providing only group-level proof of ownership rather than individual traceability. We propose EmbTracker, a server-side, traceable black-box watermarking framework specifically designed for FedLMs. EmbTracker achieves black-box verifiability by embedding a backdoor-based watermark detectable through simple API queries. Client-level traceability is realized by injecting unique identity-specific watermarks into the model distributed to each client. In this way, a leaked model can be attributed to a specific culprit, ensuring robustness even against non-cooperative participants. Extensive experiments on various language and vision-language models demonstrate that EmbTracker achieves robust traceability with verification rates near 100\%, high resilience against removal attacks (fine-tuning, pruning, quantization), and negligible impact on primary task performance (typically within 1-2\%).

Despite progress in Embodied AI, Vision-and-Language Navigation systems remain vulnerable to adversarial visual disturbances. Most existing methods rely on white-box access to target model gradients, which is often unrealistic for real-world deployed systems and computationally exhaustive due to recursive backpropagation for optimization, limiting their applicability. While previous black-box methods predominantly target single-step, instantaneous decision tasks, they struggle to handle the task complexities and temporal dependencies. This highlights the need for a gradient-free attack method that can effectively disrupt the multistep sequential perception-action loop using only observable inputs and outputs. Therefore, we propose AdvNav, a behavior-guided black-box adversarial attack framework that disturbs an agent's first-person views during navigation. To construct an informative surrogate objective for effective optimization guidance in gradient-free search under the black-box setting, we design a dual-granularity behavior-based feedback, aggregating a trajectory-level performance score representing overall navigation degradation, an action-level reward score considering the potential decision risk, and a deviation indicator, all of which are extracted from the agent's self-output behaviors. This feedback guides a hybrid optimization strategy that heuristically tunes perturbation strength via adaptive updates and evolves noise spatial structure genetically, to iteratively discover the most disruptive noise configuration. Evaluated against Transformer-based HAMT and LLM-based MapGPT with two types of backbones on R2R dataset, AdvNav achieves 49.70/65.96/87.30% Attack Success Rate. The result demonstrates the effectiveness and generality of AdvNav, reveals critical perception vulnerabilities and offers insights for the design of future resilient VLN models.

Large language models (LLMs) specializing in natural language generation (NLG) have recently started exhibiting promising capabilities across a variety of domains. However, gauging the trustworthiness of responses generated by LLMs remains an open challenge, with limited research on uncertainty quantification (UQ) for NLG. Furthermore, existing literature typically assumes white-box access to language models, which is becoming unrealistic either due to the closed-source nature of the latest LLMs or computational constraints. In this work, we investigate UQ in NLG for black-box LLMs. We first differentiate uncertainty vs confidence: the former refers to the "dispersion" of the potential predictions for a fixed input, and the latter refers to the confidence on a particular prediction/generation. We then propose and compare several confidence/uncertainty metrics, applying them to selective NLG where unreliable results could either be ignored or yielded for further assessment. Experiments were carried out with several popular LLMs on question-answering datasets (for evaluation purposes). Results reveal that a simple metric for the semantic dispersion can be a reliable predictor of the quality of LLM responses, providing valuable insights for practitioners on uncertainty management when adopting LLMs. The code to replicate our experiments is available at https://github.com/zlin7/UQ-NLG.

Methods for adapting language models (LMs) to new tasks and domains have traditionally assumed white-box access to the model, and work by modifying its parameters. However, this is incompatible with a recent trend in the field, where the highest quality models are only available as black-boxes through inference APIs. Even when the model weights are available, the computational cost of fine-tuning large LMs can be prohibitive for most practitioners. In this work, we present a lightweight method for adapting large LMs to new domains and tasks, assuming no access to their weights or intermediate activations. Our approach fine-tunes a small white-box LM and combines it with the large black-box LM at the probability level through a small network, learned on a small validation set. We validate our approach by adapting a large LM (OPT-30B) to several domains and a downstream task (machine translation), observing improved performance in all cases, of up to 9%, while using a domain expert 23x smaller.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved widespread adoption, yet our understanding of their behavior remains limited, particularly in detecting data contamination and hallucinations. While recently proposed probing techniques provide insights through activation analysis, they require "white-box" access to model internals, often unavailable. Current "gray-box" approaches typically analyze only the probability of the actual tokens in the sequence with simple task-specific heuristics. Importantly, these methods overlook the rich information contained in the full token distribution at each processing step. To address these limitations, we propose that gray-box analysis should leverage the complete observable output of LLMs, consisting of both the previously used token probabilities as well as the complete token distribution sequences - a unified data type we term LOS (LLM Output Signature). To this end, we develop a transformer-based approach to process LOS that theoretically guarantees approximation of existing techniques while enabling more nuanced analysis. Our approach achieves superior performance on hallucination and data contamination detection in gray-box settings, significantly outperforming existing baselines. Furthermore, it demonstrates strong transfer capabilities across datasets and LLMs, suggesting that LOS captures fundamental patterns in LLM behavior. Our code is available at: https://github.com/BarSGuy/LLM-Output-Signatures-Network.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhance LLMs with external knowledge but introduce a critical attack surface: corpus poisoning. While recent studies have demonstrated the potential of such attacks, they typically rely on impractical assumptions, such as white-box access or known user queries, thereby underestimating the difficulty of real-world exploitation. In this paper, we bridge this gap by proposing MIRAGE, a novel multi-stage poisoning pipeline designed for strict black-box and query-agnostic environments. Operating on surrogate model feedback, MIRAGE functions as an automated optimization framework that integrates three key mechanisms: it utilizes persona-driven query synthesis to approximate latent user search distributions, employs semantic anchoring to imperceptibly embed these intents for high retrieval visibility, and leverages an adversarial variant of Test-Time Preference Optimization (TPO) to maximize persuasion. To rigorously evaluate this threat, we construct a new benchmark derived from three long-form, domain-specific datasets. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIRAGE significantly outperforms existing baselines in both attack efficacy and stealthiness, exhibiting remarkable transferability across diverse retriever-LLM configurations and highlighting the urgent need for robust defense strategies.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

Membership inference attacks aim to infer whether an individual record was used to train a model, serving as a key tool for disclosure auditing. While such evaluations are useful to demonstrate risk, they are computationally expensive and often make strong assumptions about potential adversaries' access to models and training environments, and thus do not provide very tight bounds on leakage from potential attacks. We show how prior claims around black-box access being sufficient for optimal membership inference do not hold for most useful settings such as stochastic gradient descent, and that optimal membership inference indeed requires white-box access. We validate our findings with a new white-box inference attack IHA (Inverse Hessian Attack) that explicitly uses model parameters by taking advantage of computing inverse-Hessian vector products. Our results show that both audits and adversaries may be able to benefit from access to model parameters, and we advocate for further research into white-box methods for membership privacy auditing.

The common toxicity and societal bias in contents generated by large language models (LLMs) necessitate strategies to reduce harm. Present solutions often demand white-box access to the model or substantial training, which is impractical for cutting-edge commercial LLMs. Moreover, prevailing prompting methods depend on external tool feedback and fail to simultaneously lessen toxicity and bias. Motivated by social psychology principles, we propose a novel strategy named perspective-taking prompting (\textsc{PeT)} that inspires LLMs to integrate diverse human perspectives and self-regulate their responses. This self-correction mechanism can significantly diminish toxicity (up to 89%) and bias (up to 73%) in LLMs' responses. Rigorous evaluations and ablation studies are conducted on two commercial LLMs (ChatGPT and GLM) and three open-source LLMs, revealing PeT's superiority in producing less harmful responses, outperforming five strong baselines.

Cost-aware routing dynamically dispatches user queries to models of varying capability to balance performance and inference cost. However, the routing strategy introduces a new security concern that adversaries may manipulate the router to consistently select expensive high-capability models. Existing routing attacks depend on either white-box access or heuristic prompts, rendering them ineffective in real-world black-box scenarios. In this work, we propose R^2A, which aims to mislead black-box LLM routers to expensive models via adversarial suffix optimization. Specifically, R^2A deploys a hybrid ensemble surrogate router to mimic the black-box router. A suffix optimization algorithm is further adapted for the ensemble-based surrogate. Extensive experiments on multiple open-source and commercial routing systems demonstrate that {R^2A} significantly increases the routing rate to expensive models on queries of different distributions. Code and examples: https://github.com/thcxiker/R2A-Attack.

Recent advances in vision-language-action (VLA) models have greatly improved embodied AI, enabling robots to follow natural language instructions and perform diverse tasks. However, their reliance on uncurated training datasets raises serious security concerns. Existing backdoor attacks on VLAs mostly assume white-box access and result in task failures instead of enforcing specific actions. In this work, we reveal a more practical threat: attackers can manipulate VLAs by simply injecting physical objects as triggers into the training dataset. We propose goal-oriented backdoor attacks (GoBA), where the VLA behaves normally in the absence of physical triggers but executes predefined and goal-oriented actions in the presence of physical triggers. Specifically, based on a popular VLA benchmark LIBERO, we introduce BadLIBERO that incorporates diverse physical triggers and goal-oriented backdoor actions. In addition, we propose a three-level evaluation that categorizes the victim VLA's actions under GoBA into three states: nothing to do, try to do, and success to do. Experiments show that GoBA enables the victim VLA to successfully achieve the backdoor goal in 97 percentage of inputs when the physical trigger is present, while causing zero performance degradation on clean inputs. Finally, by investigating factors related to GoBA, we find that the action trajectory and trigger color significantly influence attack performance, while trigger size has surprisingly little effect. The code and BadLIBERO dataset are accessible via the project page at https://goba-attack.github.io/.

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has enabled understanding of both speech and non-speech audio, but exposing new safety risks emerging from complex audio inputs that are inadequately handled by current safeguards. We introduce SACRED-Bench (Speech-Audio Composition for RED-teaming) to evaluate the robustness of LLMs under complex audio-based attacks. Unlike existing perturbation-based methods that rely on noise optimization or white-box access, SACRED-Bench exploits speech-audio composition mechanisms. SACRED-Bench adopts three mechanisms: (a) speech overlap and multi-speaker dialogue, which embeds harmful prompts beneath or alongside benign speech; (b) speech-audio mixture, which imply unsafe intent via non-speech audio alongside benign speech or audio; and (c) diverse spoken instruction formats (open-ended QA, yes/no) that evade text-only filters. Experiments show that, even Gemini 2.5 Pro, the state-of-the-art proprietary LLM, still exhibits 66% attack success rate in SACRED-Bench test set, exposing vulnerabilities under cross-modal, speech-audio composition attacks. To bridge this gap, we propose SALMONN-Guard, a safeguard LLM that jointly inspects speech, audio, and text for safety judgments, reducing attack success down to 20%. Our results highlight the need for audio-aware defenses for the safety of multimodal LLMs. The benchmark and SALMONN-Guard checkpoints can be found at https://huggingface.co/datasets/tsinghua-ee/SACRED-Bench. Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Despite rapid advancements in video generation models, aligning their outputs with complex user intent remains challenging. Existing test-time optimization methods are typically either computationally expensive or require white-box access to model internals. To address this, we present VQQA (Video Quality Question Answering), a unified, multi-agent framework generalizable across diverse input modalities and video generation tasks. By dynamically generating visual questions and using the resulting Vision-Language Model (VLM) critiques as semantic gradients, VQQA replaces traditional, passive evaluation metrics with human-interpretable, actionable feedback. This enables a highly efficient, closed-loop prompt optimization process via a black-box natural language interface. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VQQA effectively isolates and resolves visual artifacts, substantially improving generation quality in just a few refinement steps. Applicable to both text-to-video (T2V) and image-to-video (I2V) tasks, our method achieves absolute improvements of +11.57% on T2V-CompBench and +8.43% on VBench2 over vanilla generation, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art stochastic search and prompt optimization techniques.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong reasoning capabilities, but their performance often degrades under distribution shift. Existing test-time adaptation (TTA) methods rely on gradient-based updates that require white-box access and need substantial overhead, while training-free alternatives are either static or depend on external guidance. In this paper, we propose Training-Free Test-Time Contrastive Learning TF-TTCL, a training-free adaptation framework that enables a frozen LLM to improve online by distilling supervision from its own inference experiences. Specifically, TF-TTCL implements a dynamic "Explore-Reflect-Steer" loop through three core modules: 1) Semantic Query Augmentation first diversifies problem views via multi-agent role-playing to generate different reasoning trajectories; 2) Contrastive Experience Distillation then captures the semantic gap between superior and inferior trajectories, distilling them into explicit textual rules; and 3) Contextual Rule Retrieval finally activates these stored rules during inference to dynamically steer the frozen LLM toward robust reasoning patterns while avoiding observed errors. Extensive experiments on closed-ended reasoning tasks and open-ended evaluation tasks demonstrate that TF-TTCL consistently outperforms strong zero-shot baselines and representative TTA methods under online evaluation. Code is available at https://github.com/KevinSCUTer/TF-TTCL.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across diverse tasks by encoding vast amounts of factual knowledge. However, they are still prone to hallucinations, generating incorrect or misleading information, often accompanied by high uncertainty. Existing methods for hallucination detection primarily focus on quantifying internal uncertainty, which arises from missing or conflicting knowledge within the model. However, hallucinations can also stem from external uncertainty, where ambiguous user queries lead to multiple possible interpretations. In this work, we introduce Semantic Volume, a novel mathematical measure for quantifying both external and internal uncertainty in LLMs. Our approach perturbs queries and responses, embeds them in a semantic space, and computes the determinant of the Gram matrix of the embedding vectors, capturing their dispersion as a measure of uncertainty. Our framework provides a generalizable and unsupervised uncertainty detection method without requiring white-box access to LLMs. We conduct extensive experiments on both external and internal uncertainty detection, demonstrating that our Semantic Volume method consistently outperforms existing baselines in both tasks. Additionally, we provide theoretical insights linking our measure to differential entropy, unifying and extending previous sampling-based uncertainty measures such as the semantic entropy. Semantic Volume is shown to be a robust and interpretable approach to improving the reliability of LLMs by systematically detecting uncertainty in both user queries and model responses.

Text-to-image diffusion models may generate harmful or copyrighted content, motivating research on concept erasure. However, existing approaches primarily focus on erasing concepts from text prompts, overlooking other input modalities that are increasingly critical in real-world applications such as image editing and personalized generation. These modalities can become attack surfaces, where erased concepts re-emerge despite defenses. To bridge this gap, we introduce M-ErasureBench, a novel multimodal evaluation framework that systematically benchmarks concept erasure methods across three input modalities: text prompts, learned embeddings, and inverted latents. For the latter two, we evaluate both white-box and black-box access, yielding five evaluation scenarios. Our analysis shows that existing methods achieve strong erasure performance against text prompts but largely fail under learned embeddings and inverted latents, with Concept Reproduction Rate (CRR) exceeding 90% in the white-box setting. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose IRECE (Inference-time Robustness Enhancement for Concept Erasure), a plug-and-play module that localizes target concepts via cross-attention and perturbs the associated latents during denoising. Experiments demonstrate that IRECE consistently restores robustness, reducing CRR by up to 40% under the most challenging white-box latent inversion scenario, while preserving visual quality. To the best of our knowledge, M-ErasureBench provides the first comprehensive benchmark of concept erasure beyond text prompts. Together with IRECE, our benchmark offers practical safeguards for building more reliable protective generative models.

Empowering large language models to accurately express confidence in their answers is essential for trustworthy decision-making. Previous confidence elicitation methods, which primarily rely on white-box access to internal model information or model fine-tuning, have become less suitable for LLMs, especially closed-source commercial APIs. This leads to a growing need to explore the untapped area of black-box approaches for LLM uncertainty estimation. To better break down the problem, we define a systematic framework with three components: prompting strategies for eliciting verbalized confidence, sampling methods for generating multiple responses, and aggregation techniques for computing consistency. We then benchmark these methods on two key tasks-confidence calibration and failure prediction-across five types of datasets (e.g., commonsense and arithmetic reasoning) and five widely-used LLMs including GPT-4 and LLaMA 2 Chat. Our analysis uncovers several key insights: 1) LLMs, when verbalizing their confidence, tend to be overconfident, potentially imitating human patterns of expressing confidence. 2) As model capability scales up, both calibration and failure prediction performance improve. 3) Employing our proposed strategies, such as human-inspired prompts, consistency among multiple responses, and better aggregation strategies can help mitigate this overconfidence from various perspectives. 4) Comparisons with white-box methods indicate that while white-box methods perform better, the gap is narrow, e.g., 0.522 to 0.605 in AUROC. Despite these advancements, none of these techniques consistently outperform others, and all investigated methods struggle in challenging tasks, such as those requiring professional knowledge, indicating significant scope for improvement. We believe this study can serve as a strong baseline and provide insights for eliciting confidence in black-box LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as powerful tools for a plethora of natural language processing (NLP) applications. A recent innovation, in-context learning (ICL), enables LLMs to learn new tasks by supplying a few examples in the prompt during inference time, thereby eliminating the need for model fine-tuning. While LLMs have been utilized in several applications, their applicability in explaining the behavior of other models remains relatively unexplored. Despite the growing number of new explanation techniques, many require white-box access to the model and/or are computationally expensive, highlighting a need for next-generation post hoc explainers. In this work, we present the first framework to study the effectiveness of LLMs in explaining other predictive models. More specifically, we propose a novel framework encompassing multiple prompting strategies: i) Perturbation-based ICL, ii) Prediction-based ICL, iii) Instruction-based ICL, and iv) Explanation-based ICL, with varying levels of information about the underlying ML model and the local neighborhood of the test sample. We conduct extensive experiments with real-world benchmark datasets to demonstrate that LLM-generated explanations perform on par with state-of-the-art post hoc explainers using their ability to leverage ICL examples and their internal knowledge in generating model explanations. On average, across four datasets and two ML models, we observe that LLMs identify the most important feature with 72.19% accuracy, opening up new frontiers in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) to explore LLM-based explanation frameworks.

Discrete text-trigger optimization -- searching for text sequences that, when ingested by a model, steer it toward a specified objective -- underpins model red-teaming (e.g., LLM jailbreaks), as well as auditing and interpretability. However, the current state of discrete optimizers hinders their adoption and progress. First, existing optimizers, when open-sourced at all, are scattered across research codebases tied to specific models, objectives, and problem domains. Second, optimizer variants proliferate, each requiring engineering overhead to use or extend, and remaining hard to compare head-to-head. Together, these raise the bar for adopting optimizers in existing or new domains, and for advancing them via new strategies. We address these gaps with TROPT, the first open-source framework that unifies discrete optimizers' execution and standardizes their development under a single interface. TROPT makes it easy to customize end-to-end optimization recipes by swapping any component -- models, objectives, and optimizers -- extending its reach across domains and new applications. TROPT currently ships with 30+ optimization recipes -- covering applications such as jailbreaking and probing model internals -- built from 15+ optimizers (spanning white-box to black-box access) and 15+ losses, from foundational to state-of-the-art methods. Demonstrating its utility, we leverage TROPT in several studies: (i) controlled, large-scale experiments comparing and enhancing optimization strategies for LLM jailbreaks, revealing potent-yet-underadopted techniques; and (ii) porting optimizers from one domain (e.g., LLM jailbreak) to new domains (e.g., corpus-poisoning embedding model). In all, TROPT significantly lowers the barrier to adopting and advancing discrete text optimization.

The widespread application of large VLMs makes ensuring their secure deployment critical. While recent studies have demonstrated jailbreak attacks on VLMs, existing approaches are limited: they require either white-box access, restricting practicality, or rely on manually crafted patterns, leading to poor sample diversity and scalability. To address these gaps, we propose JPRO, a novel multi-agent collaborative framework designed for automated VLM jailbreaking. It effectively overcomes the shortcomings of prior methods in attack diversity and scalability. Through the coordinated action of four specialized agents and its two core modules: Tactic-Driven Seed Generation and Adaptive Optimization Loop, JPRO generates effective and diverse attack samples. Experimental results show that JPRO achieves over a 60\% attack success rate on multiple advanced VLMs, including GPT-4o, significantly outperforming existing methods. As a black-box attack approach, JPRO not only uncovers critical security vulnerabilities in multimodal models but also offers valuable insights for evaluating and enhancing VLM robustness.

Reinforcement learning for code generation relies on verifiable rewards from unit test pass rates. Yet high-quality test suites are scarce, existing datasets offer limited coverage, and static rewards fail to adapt as models improve. Recent self-play methods unify code and test generation in a single model, but face a inherent dilemma: white-box access leads to self-collusion where the model produces trivial tests for easy rewards, yet black-box restriction yields generic tests that miss implementation-specific bugs. We introduce Code-A1, an adversarial co-evolution framework that jointly optimizes a Code LLM and a Test LLM with opposing objectives. The Code LLM is rewarded for passing more tests, while the Test LLM is rewarded for exposing more defects. This architectural separation eliminates self-collusion risks and safely enables white-box test generation, where the Test LLM can inspect candidate code to craft targeted adversarial tests. We further introduce a Mistake Book mechanism for experience replay and a composite reward balancing test validity with adversarial difficulty. Experiments on Qwen2.5-Coder models demonstrate that Code-A1 achieves code generation performance matching or exceeding models trained on human-annotated tests, while significantly improving test generation capability.

To perform adversarial attacks in the physical world, many studies have proposed adversarial camouflage, a method to hide a target object by applying camouflage patterns on 3D object surfaces. For obtaining optimal physical adversarial camouflage, previous studies have utilized the so-called neural renderer, as it supports differentiability. However, existing neural renderers cannot fully represent various real-world transformations due to a lack of control of scene parameters compared to the legacy photo-realistic renderers. In this paper, we propose the Differentiable Transformation Attack (DTA), a framework for generating a robust physical adversarial pattern on a target object to camouflage it against object detection models with a wide range of transformations. It utilizes our novel Differentiable Transformation Network (DTN), which learns the expected transformation of a rendered object when the texture is changed while preserving the original properties of the target object. Using our attack framework, an adversary can gain both the advantages of the legacy photo-realistic renderers including various physical-world transformations and the benefit of white-box access by offering differentiability. Our experiments show that our camouflaged 3D vehicles can successfully evade state-of-the-art object detection models in the photo-realistic environment (i.e., CARLA on Unreal Engine). Furthermore, our demonstration on a scaled Tesla Model 3 proves the applicability and transferability of our method to the real world.

With the growing prevalence of large language model (LLM) generated content, watermarking is considered a promising approach for attributing text to LLMs and distinguishing it from human-written content. A prominent class of techniques embeds subtle but detectable signals in generated text by modifying token sampling probabilities. However, such methods are unsuitable for open-source models, where users have white-box access and can easily disable watermarking during inference. In this work, we introduce OpenStamp, a watermarking technique that encodes the watermarking logic directly into the model weights by modifying only the final projection, or unembedding, layer. Through experiments across two models, we show that OpenStamp achieves superior detection performance, with minimal degradation in model capabilities compared to prior methods. The implanted watermark is explicitly designed, and empirically confirmed, to be more robust to paraphrasing attacks and harder to scrub off through post-hoc fine-tuning than prior open-source watermarks. To enable developers to watermark their models, we release our code alongside watermarked versions of 4 popular open-source models.

Hallucination detection has become a pressing requirement for trustworthy AI deployment at scale. The most accurate detection methods depend on GPU-intensive inference, proprietary API calls, or white-box access to the generating model. This puts them out of reach for resource-constrained researchers and practitioners. In this paper, we explore a practical alternative: how well can hallucination detection perform using only lightweight, CPU-feasible methods built on publicly available models? We systematically benchmark five such methods: ROUGE-L, semantic similarity, BERTScore, a Natural Language Inference (NLI) detector based on a FEVER-trained DeBERTa model, and a score-level ensemble of similarity and NLI. We evaluate them across all three tasks of the HaluEval benchmark: question answering (QA), dialogue, and summarisation. We calibrate each method on a held-out validation split and evaluate it on 2,000 test instances per task. We find that no single method dominates and performance is highly task-dependent. The ensemble performs best on QA (F1 = 0.792, AUC-ROC = 0.873), the NLI detector leads on dialogue (AUC-ROC = 0.713), and all five methods degrade to near-random performance on summarisation (AUC-ROC between 0.469 and 0.574). This task-dependence and the systematic failure on summarisation map the practical frontier of GPU-free hallucination detection. They give practical guidance for method selection under computational constraints. All experiments run on a standard laptop CPU using public models.

Text-to-image (T2I) models generate realistic likenesses of some individuals when prompted with their names, raising privacy concerns. However, distinguishing whether a generated face is memorized or fabricated currently requires ground-truth photos, access to training data, or white-box access to model internals, limiting applicability. We introduce a fully black-box behavioral probe that distinguishes between these regimes while requiring no reference photos or prior knowledge of training data. To benchmark this task, we present the NAMESAKES dataset of over one thousand names and faces of public figures spanning a wide range of fame levels, along with perturbed, less famous names. Experiments on state-of-the-art T2I models show that our probe substantially predicts identity memorization and separates memorized from unrecognized names, with further insights into differences across model families.

Recently, methods for skeleton-based human activity recognition have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, these attack methods require either the full knowledge of the victim (i.e. white-box attacks), access to training data (i.e. transfer-based attacks) or frequent model queries (i.e. black-box attacks). All their requirements are highly restrictive, raising the question of how detrimental the vulnerability is. In this paper, we show that the vulnerability indeed exists. To this end, we consider a new attack task: the attacker has no access to the victim model or the training data or labels, where we coin the term hard no-box attack. Specifically, we first learn a motion manifold where we define an adversarial loss to compute a new gradient for the attack, named skeleton-motion-informed (SMI) gradient. Our gradient contains information of the motion dynamics, which is different from existing gradient-based attack methods that compute the loss gradient assuming each dimension in the data is independent. The SMI gradient can augment many gradient-based attack methods, leading to a new family of no-box attack methods. Extensive evaluation and comparison show that our method imposes a real threat to existing classifiers. They also show that the SMI gradient improves the transferability and imperceptibility of adversarial samples in both no-box and transfer-based black-box settings.

Text-to-image (T2I) generative models such as Stable Diffusion and FLUX can synthesize realistic, high-quality images directly from textual prompts. The resulting image quality depends critically on well-crafted prompts that specify both subjects and stylistic modifiers, which have become valuable digital assets. However, the rising value and ubiquity of high-quality prompts expose them to security and intellectual-property risks. One key threat is the prompt stealing attack, i.e., the task of recovering the textual prompt that generated a given image. Prompt stealing enables unauthorized extraction and reuse of carefully engineered prompts, yet it can also support beneficial applications such as data attribution, model provenance analysis, and watermarking validation. Existing approaches often assume white-box gradient access, require large-scale labeled datasets for supervised training, or rely solely on captioning without explicit optimization, limiting their practicality and adaptability. To address these challenges, we propose PROMPTMINER, a black-box prompt stealing framework that decouples the task into two phases: (1) a reinforcement learning-based optimization phase to reconstruct the primary subject, and (2) a fuzzing-driven search phase to recover stylistic modifiers. Experiments across multiple datasets and diffusion backbones demonstrate that PROMPTMINER achieves superior results, with CLIP similarity up to 0.958 and textual alignment with SBERT up to 0.751, surpassing all baselines. Even when applied to in-the-wild images with unknown generators, it outperforms the strongest baseline by 7.5 percent in CLIP similarity, demonstrating better generalization. Finally, PROMPTMINER maintains strong performance under defensive perturbations, highlighting remarkable robustness. Code: https://github.com/aaFrostnova/PromptMiner

Languages with rich static semantics, such as Rust, provide stronger guarantees for AI-generated code, but their strictness makes generation more difficult. Off-the-shelf compilers can provide useful feedback post-generation, but does not guide intermediate generation steps, such as those during autoregressive LLM decoding. Constrained decoding intervenes earlier by rejecting invalid tokens during sampling, but requires white-box model access and costly reimplementation for semantic constraints.We introduce generative compilation, the first approach to obtaining compiler feedback on partial programs during generation. The core technical device is a sealor: a lightweight, mostly syntax-guided transformation that converts partial programs into complete ones that standard compilers can diagnose. It is designed such that possible-to-complete partial programs are never rejected, while preserving enough code context to catch genuine dead ends early. We construct such a sealor on a core Rust-like calculus and prove that it satisfies these properties, all mechanized in Lean. We extend it to the first partial-program checker for real Rust. We evaluate our method on challenging repository-level Rust coding tasks, across both frontier black-box and open-weight models. We show that generative compilation reduces non-compiling outputs and improves functional correctness, relative to standard post-generation feedback. It does so by detecting a broad range of errors close to their source and early during generation, thereby reducing errors cascades and enabling focused diagnostics. More broadly, generative compilation is a step toward making compilers a first-class citizen of AI-assisted programming active during generation, rather than a separate post-generation check.

Large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, including health applications. In this paper, we study how LLMs can be used to scale biomedical knowledge curation. We find that while LLMs already possess decent competency in structuring biomedical text, by distillation into a task-specific student model through self-supervised learning, substantial gains can be attained over out-of-box LLMs, with additional advantages such as cost, efficiency, and white-box model access. We conduct a case study on adverse drug event (ADE) extraction, which is an important area for improving care. On standard ADE extraction evaluation, a GPT-3.5 distilled PubMedBERT model attained comparable accuracy as supervised state-of-the-art models without using any labeled data. Despite being over 1,000 times smaller, the distilled model outperformed its teacher GPT-3.5 by over 6 absolute points in F1 and GPT-4 by over 5 absolute points. Ablation studies on distillation model choice (e.g., PubMedBERT vs BioGPT) and ADE extraction architecture shed light on best practice for biomedical knowledge extraction. Similar gains were attained by distillation for other standard biomedical knowledge extraction tasks such as gene-disease associations and protected health information, further illustrating the promise of this approach.

Activation steering methods are widely used to control large language model (LLM) behavior and are often interpreted as revealing meaningful internal representations. This interpretation assumes that steering directions are identifiable and uniquely recoverable from input-output behavior. We show that, under white-box single-layer access, steering vectors are fundamentally non-identifiable due to large equivalence classes of behaviorally indistinguishable interventions. Empirically, we find that orthogonal perturbations achieve near-equivalent efficacy with negligible effect sizes across multiple models and traits, with pre-trained semantic classifiers confirming equivalence at the output level. We estimate null-space dimensionality via SVD of activation covariance matrices and validate that equivalence holds robustly throughout the operationally relevant steering range. Critically, we show that non-identifiability is a robust geometric property that persists across diverse prompt distributions. These findings reveal fundamental interpretability limits and highlight the need for structural constraints beyond behavioral testing to enable reliable alignment interventions.

Knowledge distillation has become a primary mechanism for transferring reasoning and domain expertise from frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) to smaller, deployable students. However, the dominant paradigm remains off-policy: students train on static teacher-generated data and never encounter their own errors during learning. This train--test mismatch, an instance of exposure bias, causes prediction errors to compound autoregressively at inference time. On-Policy Distillation (OPD) addresses this by letting the student generate its own trajectories and receive teacher feedback on these self-generated outputs, grounding distillation in the theory of interactive imitation learning. Despite rapid growth spanning divergence minimization, reward-guided learning, and self-play, the OPD literature remains fragmented with no unified treatment. This survey provides the first comprehensive overview of OPD for LLMs. We introduce a unified f-divergence framework over on-policy samples and organize the landscape along three orthogonal dimensions: feedback signal (logit-based, outcome-based, or self-play), teacher access (white-box, black-box, or teacher-free), and loss granularity (token-level, sequence-level, or hybrid). We systematically analyze representative methods, examine industrial deployments, and identify open problems including distillation scaling laws, uncertainty-aware feedback, and agent-level distillation.

In this paper we undertake a systematic study of privacy attacks against open source Large Language Models (LLMs), where an adversary has access to either the model weights, gradients, or losses, and tries to exploit them to learn something about the underlying training data. Our headline results are the first membership inference attacks (MIAs) against pre-trained LLMs that are able to simultaneously achieve high TPRs and low FPRs, and a pipeline showing that over 50% (!) of the fine-tuning dataset can be extracted from a fine-tuned LLM in natural settings. We consider varying degrees of access to the underlying model, customization of the language model, and resources available to the attacker. In the pre-trained setting, we propose three new white-box MIAs: an attack based on the gradient norm, a supervised neural network classifier, and a single step loss ratio attack. All outperform existing black-box baselines, and our supervised attack closes the gap between MIA attack success against LLMs and other types of models. In fine-tuning, we find that given access to the loss of the fine-tuned and base models, a fine-tuned loss ratio attack FLoRA is able to achieve near perfect MIA peformance. We then leverage these MIAs to extract fine-tuning data from fine-tuned language models. We find that the pipeline of generating from fine-tuned models prompted with a small snippet of the prefix of each training example, followed by using FLoRa to select the most likely training sample, succeeds the majority of the fine-tuning dataset after only 3 epochs of fine-tuning. Taken together, these findings show that highly effective MIAs are available in almost all LLM training settings, and highlight that great care must be taken before LLMs are fine-tuned on highly sensitive data and then deployed.

Recent advancements in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have shown groundbreaking capabilities across diverse multimodal tasks. However, these models remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks, where adversaries craft subtle perturbations to bypass safety mechanisms and trigger harmful outputs. Existing white-box attacks methods require full model accessibility, suffer from computing costs and exhibit insufficient adversarial transferability, making them impractical for real-world, black-box settings. To address these limitations, we propose a black-box jailbreak attack on LVLMs via Zeroth-Order optimization using Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (ZO-SPSA). ZO-SPSA provides three key advantages: (i) gradient-free approximation by input-output interactions without requiring model knowledge, (ii) model-agnostic optimization without the surrogate model and (iii) lower resource requirements with reduced GPU memory consumption. We evaluate ZO-SPSA on three LVLMs, including InstructBLIP, LLaVA and MiniGPT-4, achieving the highest jailbreak success rate of 83.0% on InstructBLIP, while maintaining imperceptible perturbations comparable to white-box methods. Moreover, adversarial examples generated from MiniGPT-4 exhibit strong transferability to other LVLMs, with ASR reaching 64.18%. These findings underscore the real-world feasibility of black-box jailbreaks and expose critical weaknesses in the safety mechanisms of current LVLMs

Knowledge editing (KE) aims to efficiently and precisely modify the behavior of large language models (LLMs) to update specific knowledge without negatively influencing other knowledge. Current research primarily focuses on white-box LLMs editing, overlooking an important scenario: black-box LLMs editing, where LLMs are accessed through interfaces and only textual output is available. To address the limitations of existing evaluations that are not inapplicable to black-box LLM editing and lack comprehensiveness, we propose a multi-perspective evaluation framework, incorporating the assessment of style retention for the first time. To tackle privacy leaks of editing data and style over-editing in current methods, we introduce a novel postEdit framework, resolving privacy concerns through downstream post-processing and maintaining textual style consistency via fine-grained editing to original responses. Experiments and analysis on two benchmarks demonstrate that postEdit outperforms all baselines and achieves strong generalization, especially with huge improvements on style retention (average +20.82%uparrow).

Despite the impressive generative abilities of black-box large language models (LLMs), their inherent opacity hinders further advancements in capabilities such as reasoning, planning, and personalization. Existing works aim to enhance LLM capabilities via domain-specific adaptation or in-context learning, which require additional training on accessible model parameters, an infeasible option for black-box LLMs. To address this challenge, we introduce Matryoshika, a lightweight white-box LLM controller that guides a large-scale black-box LLM generator by decomposing complex tasks into a series of intermediate outputs. Specifically, we consider the black-box LLM as an environment, with Matryoshika serving as a policy to provide intermediate guidance through prompts for driving the black-box LLM. Matryoshika is trained to pivot the outputs of the black-box LLM aligning with preferences during iterative interaction, which enables controllable multi-turn generation and self-improvement in optimizing intermediate guidance. Empirical evaluations on three diverse tasks demonstrate that Matryoshika effectively enhances the capabilities of black-box LLMs in complex, long-horizon tasks, including reasoning, planning, and personalization. By leveraging this pioneering controller-generator framework to mitigate dependence on model parameters, Matryoshika provides a transparent and practical solution for improving black-box LLMs through controllable multi-turn generation using white-box LLMs.

Data-free meta-learning (DFML) aims to enable efficient learning of new tasks by meta-learning from a collection of pre-trained models without access to the training data. Existing DFML work can only meta-learn from (i) white-box and (ii) small-scale pre-trained models (iii) with the same architecture, neglecting the more practical setting where the users only have inference access to the APIs with arbitrary model architectures and model scale inside. To solve this issue, we propose a Bi-level Data-free Meta Knowledge Distillation (BiDf-MKD) framework to transfer more general meta knowledge from a collection of black-box APIs to one single meta model. Specifically, by just querying APIs, we inverse each API to recover its training data via a zero-order gradient estimator and then perform meta-learning via a novel bi-level meta knowledge distillation structure, in which we design a boundary query set recovery technique to recover a more informative query set near the decision boundary. In addition, to encourage better generalization within the setting of limited API budgets, we propose task memory replay to diversify the underlying task distribution by covering more interpolated tasks. Extensive experiments in various real-world scenarios show the superior performance of our BiDf-MKD framework.

With the rapidly increasing application of large language models (LLMs), their abuse has caused many undesirable societal problems such as fake news, academic dishonesty, and information pollution. This makes AI-generated text (AIGT) detection of great importance. Among existing methods, white-box methods are generally superior to black-box methods in terms of performance and generalizability, but they require access to LLMs' internal states and are not applicable to black-box settings. In this paper, we propose to estimate word generation probabilities as pseudo white-box features via multiple re-sampling to help improve AIGT detection under the black-box setting. Specifically, we design POGER, a proxy-guided efficient re-sampling method, which selects a small subset of representative words (e.g., 10 words) for performing multiple re-sampling in black-box AIGT detection. Experiments on datasets containing texts from humans and seven LLMs show that POGER outperforms all baselines in macro F1 under black-box, partial white-box, and out-of-distribution settings and maintains lower re-sampling costs than its existing counterparts.

The lack of adversarial robustness has been recognized as an important issue for state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks (DNNs). Thereby, robustifying ML models against adversarial attacks is now a major focus of research. However, nearly all existing defense methods, particularly for robust training, made the white-box assumption that the defender has the access to the details of an ML model (or its surrogate alternatives if available), e.g., its architectures and parameters. Beyond existing works, in this paper we aim to address the problem of black-box defense: How to robustify a black-box model using just input queries and output feedback? Such a problem arises in practical scenarios, where the owner of the predictive model is reluctant to share model information in order to preserve privacy. To this end, we propose a general notion of defensive operation that can be applied to black-box models, and design it through the lens of denoised smoothing (DS), a first-order (FO) certified defense technique. To allow the design of merely using model queries, we further integrate DS with the zeroth-order (gradient-free) optimization. However, a direct implementation of zeroth-order (ZO) optimization suffers a high variance of gradient estimates, and thus leads to ineffective defense. To tackle this problem, we next propose to prepend an autoencoder (AE) to a given (black-box) model so that DS can be trained using variance-reduced ZO optimization. We term the eventual defense as ZO-AE-DS. In practice, we empirically show that ZO-AE- DS can achieve improved accuracy, certified robustness, and query complexity over existing baselines. And the effectiveness of our approach is justified under both image classification and image reconstruction tasks. Codes are available at https://github.com/damon-demon/Black-Box-Defense.

We describe a novel attribution method which is grounded in Sensitivity Analysis and uses Sobol indices. Beyond modeling the individual contributions of image regions, Sobol indices provide an efficient way to capture higher-order interactions between image regions and their contributions to a neural network's prediction through the lens of variance. We describe an approach that makes the computation of these indices efficient for high-dimensional problems by using perturbation masks coupled with efficient estimators to handle the high dimensionality of images. Importantly, we show that the proposed method leads to favorable scores on standard benchmarks for vision (and language models) while drastically reducing the computing time compared to other black-box methods -- even surpassing the accuracy of state-of-the-art white-box methods which require access to internal representations. Our code is freely available: https://github.com/fel-thomas/Sobol-Attribution-Method

Mechanistic interpretability (MI) requires full access to model internals, yet the APIs for most widely deployed language models at best expose log-probabilities over output tokens. This creates a surrogate problem: when do measurements made on open models allow us to make claims about a closed model? We evaluate surrogate fidelity at the prediction, attribution, and representation levels. For binary classification tasks, log-odds provide an API-compatible scalar readout of the model's representation space, and leave-one-out attributions provide insight into model behavior. Across eleven models spanning four families (Llama, Qwen, GPT, and Gemini), we find that prediction fidelity substantially overstates attribution fidelity: models that agree on what the answer is often disagree on why. We document an access-validity inversion: white-box signals like attention patterns and perturbation magnitudes are highly stable across models but only weakly predictive of causal attributions, which black-box input ablations capture by design. Mechanistic insight does not automatically transfer to closed targets, and prediction-level agreement is insufficient to warrant such transfer. Code and results are available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/surrogate.

Hallucinations remain a major obstacle for large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains. We present HALT (Hallucination Assessment via Log-probs as Time series), a lightweight hallucination detector that leverages only the top-20 token log-probabilities from LLM generations as a time series. HALT uses a gated recurrent unit model combined with entropy-based features to learn model calibration bias, providing an extremely efficient alternative to large encoders. Unlike white-box approaches, HALT does not require access to hidden states or attention maps, relying only on output log-probabilities. Unlike black-box approaches, it operates on log-probs rather than surface-form text, which enables stronger domain generalization and compatibility with proprietary LLMs without requiring access to internal weights. To benchmark performance, we introduce HUB (Hallucination detection Unified Benchmark), which consolidates prior datasets into ten capabilities covering both reasoning tasks (Algorithmic, Commonsense, Mathematical, Symbolic, Code Generation) and general purpose skills (Chat, Data-to-Text, Question Answering, Summarization, World Knowledge). While being 30x smaller, HALT outperforms Lettuce, a fine-tuned modernBERT-base encoder, achieving a 60x speedup gain on HUB. HALT and HUB together establish an effective framework for hallucination detection across diverse LLM capabilities.

Adversarial attacks on image models threaten system robustness by introducing imperceptible perturbations that cause incorrect predictions. We investigate human-aligned learned lossy compression as a defense mechanism, comparing two learned models (HiFiC and ELIC) against traditional JPEG across various quality levels. Our experiments on ImageNet subsets demonstrate that learned compression methods outperform JPEG, particularly for Vision Transformer architectures, by preserving semantically meaningful content while removing adversarial noise. Even in white-box settings where attackers can access the defense, these methods maintain substantial effectiveness. We also show that sequential compression--applying rounds of compression/decompression--significantly enhances defense efficacy while maintaining classification performance. Our findings reveal that human-aligned compression provides an effective, computationally efficient defense that protects the image features most relevant to human and machine understanding. It offers a practical approach to improving model robustness against adversarial threats.

The efficacy of an large language model (LLM) generated text detector depends substantially on the availability of sizable training data. White-box zero-shot detectors, which require no such data, are nonetheless limited by the accessibility of the source model of the LLM-generated text. In this paper, we propose an simple but effective black-box zero-shot detection approach, predicated on the observation that human-written texts typically contain more grammatical errors than LLM-generated texts. This approach entails computing the Grammar Error Correction Score (GECScore) for the given text to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated text. Extensive experimental results show that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art (SOTA) zero-shot and supervised methods, achieving an average AUROC of 98.7% and showing strong robustness against paraphrase and adversarial perturbation attacks.

Determining which data samples were used to train a model, known as Membership Inference Attack (MIA), is a well-studied and important problem with implications on data privacy. SotA methods (which are black-box attacks) rely on training many auxiliary reference models to imitate the behavior of the attacked model. As such, they rely on assumptions which rarely hold in real-world settings: (i) the attacker knows the training hyperparameters; (ii) all available non-training samples come from the same distribution as the training data; and (iii) the fraction of training data in the evaluation set is known. We show that removing these assumptions significantly harms the performance of black-box attacks. We introduce ImpMIA, a Membership Inference Attack that exploits the Implicit Bias of neural networks. Building on the maximum-margin implicit bias theory, ImpMIA uses the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions to identify training samples -- those whose gradients most strongly reconstruct the trained model's parameters. Our approach is optimization-based, and requires NO training of reference-models, thus removing the need for any knowledge/assumptions regarding the attacked model's training procedure. While ImpMIA is a white-box attack (a setting which assumes access to model weights), this is becoming increasingly realistic given that many models are publicly available (e.g., via Hugging Face). ImpMIA achieves SotA performance compared to both black and white box attacks in settings where only the model weights are known, and a superset of the training data is available.

Machine Learning systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and will highly likely produce incorrect outputs under these attacks. There are white-box and black-box attacks regarding to adversary's access level to the victim learning algorithm. To defend the learning systems from these attacks, existing methods in the speech domain focus on modifying input signals and testing the behaviours of speech recognizers. We, however, formulate the defense as a classification problem and present a strategy for systematically generating adversarial example datasets: one for white-box attacks and one for black-box attacks, containing both adversarial and normal examples. The white-box attack is a gradient-based method on Baidu DeepSpeech with the Mozilla Common Voice database while the black-box attack is a gradient-free method on a deep model-based keyword spotting system with the Google Speech Command dataset. The generated datasets are used to train a proposed Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), together with cepstral features, to detect adversarial examples. Experimental results show that, it is possible to accurately distinct between adversarial and normal examples for known attacks, in both single-condition and multi-condition training settings, while the performance degrades dramatically for unknown attacks. The adversarial datasets and the source code are made publicly available.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Speculative decoding is an effective method for accelerating inference of large language models (LLMs) by employing a small draft model to predict the output of a target model. However, when adapting speculative decoding to domain-specific target models, the acceptance rate of the generic draft model drops significantly due to domain shift. In this work, we systematically investigate knowledge distillation techniques for training domain draft models to improve their speculation accuracy. We compare white-box and black-box distillation approaches and explore their effectiveness in various data accessibility scenarios, including historical user queries, curated domain data, and synthetically generated alignment data. Our experiments across Function Calling, Biology, and Chinese domains show that offline distillation consistently outperforms online distillation by 11% to 25%, white-box distillation surpasses black-box distillation by 2% to 10%, and data scaling trends hold across domains. Additionally, we find that synthetic data can effectively align draft models and achieve 80% to 93% of the performance of training on historical user queries. These findings provide practical guidelines for training domain-specific draft models to improve speculative decoding efficiency.

In a model inversion (MI) attack, an adversary abuses access to a machine learning (ML) model to infer and reconstruct private training data. Remarkable progress has been made in the white-box and black-box setups, where the adversary has access to the complete model or the model's soft output respectively. However, there is very limited study in the most challenging but practically important setup: Label-only MI attacks, where the adversary only has access to the model's predicted label (hard label) without confidence scores nor any other model information. In this work, we propose LOKT, a novel approach for label-only MI attacks. Our idea is based on transfer of knowledge from the opaque target model to surrogate models. Subsequently, using these surrogate models, our approach can harness advanced white-box attacks. We propose knowledge transfer based on generative modelling, and introduce a new model, Target model-assisted ACGAN (T-ACGAN), for effective knowledge transfer. Our method casts the challenging label-only MI into the more tractable white-box setup. We provide analysis to support that surrogate models based on our approach serve as effective proxies for the target model for MI. Our experiments show that our method significantly outperforms existing SOTA Label-only MI attack by more than 15% across all MI benchmarks. Furthermore, our method compares favorably in terms of query budget. Our study highlights rising privacy threats for ML models even when minimal information (i.e., hard labels) is exposed. Our study highlights rising privacy threats for ML models even when minimal information (i.e., hard labels) is exposed. Our code, demo, models and reconstructed data are available at our project page: https://ngoc-nguyen-0.github.io/lokt/

Hallucination detection is essential for the reliable deployment of large language models (LLMs). However, existing evaluations face two core challenges: inconsistent inference configuration and evaluation, and limited coverage of downstream domains and tasks. Consequently, reported detector performance is often difficult to compare, reproduce, and generalize beyond specific experimental settings. We introduce OpenHalDet, a unified benchmark for hallucination detection across diverse generation scenarios. OpenHalDet standardizes the evaluation pipeline, from prompt construction and response generation to truthfulness annotation, detector scoring, and metric computation. It supports heterogeneous detector families under different access settings, including black-box methods that use only generated outputs, gray-box methods that rely on probability-based signals, and white-box methods that exploit internal model signals. By bringing diverse tasks, models, and detectors into a shared framework, OpenHalDet enables controlled comparison and provides a systematic view of how different detection paradigms behave in LLM applications. We release OpenHalDet as an open and extensible codebase to facilitate reproducible evaluation and future development of hallucination detection methods. The code and datasets are available at https://github.com/Nellie179/Hallucination-Detection.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) excel in vision-language tasks but also pose significant risks of generating harmful content, particularly through jailbreak attacks. Jailbreak attacks refer to intentional manipulations that bypass safety mechanisms in models, leading to the generation of inappropriate or unsafe content. Detecting such attacks is critical to ensuring the responsible deployment of MLLMs. Existing jailbreak detection methods face three primary challenges: (1) Many rely on model hidden states or gradients, limiting their applicability to white-box models, where the internal workings of the model are accessible; (2) They involve high computational overhead from uncertainty-based analysis, which limits real-time detection, and (3) They require fully labeled harmful datasets, which are often scarce in real-world settings. To address these issues, we introduce a test-time adaptive framework called JAILDAM. Our method leverages a memory-based approach guided by policy-driven unsafe knowledge representations, eliminating the need for explicit exposure to harmful data. By dynamically updating unsafe knowledge during test-time, our framework improves generalization to unseen jailbreak strategies while maintaining efficiency. Experiments on multiple VLM jailbreak benchmarks demonstrate that JAILDAM delivers state-of-the-art performance in harmful content detection, improving both accuracy and speed.

Membership inference attacks serves as useful tool for fair use of language models, such as detecting potential copyright infringement and auditing data leakage. However, many current state-of-the-art attacks require access to models' hidden states or probability distribution, which prevents investigation into more widely-used, API-access only models like GPT-4. In this work, we introduce N-Gram Coverage Attack, a membership inference attack that relies solely on text outputs from the target model, enabling attacks on completely black-box models. We leverage the observation that models are more likely to memorize and subsequently generate text patterns that were commonly observed in their training data. Specifically, to make a prediction on a candidate member, N-Gram Coverage Attack first obtains multiple model generations conditioned on a prefix of the candidate. It then uses n-gram overlap metrics to compute and aggregate the similarities of these outputs with the ground truth suffix; high similarities indicate likely membership. We first demonstrate on a diverse set of existing benchmarks that N-Gram Coverage Attack outperforms other black-box methods while also impressively achieving comparable or even better performance to state-of-the-art white-box attacks - despite having access to only text outputs. Interestingly, we find that the success rate of our method scales with the attack compute budget - as we increase the number of sequences generated from the target model conditioned on the prefix, attack performance tends to improve. Having verified the accuracy of our method, we use it to investigate previously unstudied closed OpenAI models on multiple domains. We find that more recent models, such as GPT-4o, exhibit increased robustness to membership inference, suggesting an evolving trend toward improved privacy protections.

Multi-agent systems have demonstrated exceptional performance in downstream tasks beyond diverse single agent baselines. A growing body of work has explored ways to improve their reasoning and collaboration, from vote, debate, to complex interaction protocols. However, it still remains opaque why specific choice would be preferred in multi-agent systems. Inspired by the decision-making mechanism of democratic committees and The Society of Mind, we introduce Roundtable Policy, an inference-time reasoning framework for multi-agent systems that performs inference through the weighted consensus of multiple LLMs. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate its that this approach significantly enhances reasoning in complex heterogeneous scientific tasks. Roundtable Policy emphasizes structured and interpretable inference rather than opaque convergence, while requires only black-box access and uniform procedures, making it broadly applicable to diverse multi-agent systems.

A distribution inference attack aims to infer statistical properties of data used to train machine learning models. These attacks are sometimes surprisingly potent, but the factors that impact distribution inference risk are not well understood and demonstrated attacks often rely on strong and unrealistic assumptions such as full knowledge of training environments even in supposedly black-box threat scenarios. To improve understanding of distribution inference risks, we develop a new black-box attack that even outperforms the best known white-box attack in most settings. Using this new attack, we evaluate distribution inference risk while relaxing a variety of assumptions about the adversary's knowledge under black-box access, like known model architectures and label-only access. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of previously proposed defenses and introduce new defenses. We find that although noise-based defenses appear to be ineffective, a simple re-sampling defense can be highly effective. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/dissecting_distribution_inference

Spatio-temporal video grounding (STVG) requires models to identify when a referred event occurs and localize the target entity throughout that interval. Existing multimodal large language models typically serialize dense localization trajectories autoregressively, causing decoding latency to grow with tube length and allowing localization errors to propagate across time. We introduce Parallel Tube Decoding (PTD), a generative formulation that decomposes grounding into a temporal block followed by time-conditioned spatial blocks decoded simultaneously. This removes both token-level and trajectory-level dependencies, reducing the sequential decoding depth to a fixed 1 + 1 rounds, independent of tube length. To enable parallel spatial generation, we introduce Decoupled Block Attention, which preserves access to shared video-query context while eliminating cross-box dependencies, together with localization-aware policy optimization for temporal boundaries and spatial geometry. On VidSTG, PTD reduces Tube Completion Latency by 79x and increases spatial decoding throughput by 92x over standard autoregressive decoding, while also improving grounding accuracy. With a compact 4B backbone, our model performs favorably well on VidSTG and HC-STVG, and generalizes zero-shot to temporal grounding, grounded VideoQA, and referring video object tracking. Our results show parallel tube generation is an efficient and effective alternative to autoregressive localization in videos.

Vision-Language (V-L) models trained with contrastive learning to align the visual and language modalities have been shown to be strong few-shot learners. Soft prompt learning is the method of choice for few-shot downstream adaptation aiming to bridge the modality gap caused by the distribution shift induced by the new domain. While parameter-efficient, prompt learning still requires access to the model weights and can be computationally infeasible for large models with billions of parameters. To address these shortcomings, in this work, we describe a black-box method for V-L few-shot adaptation that (a) operates on pre-computed image and text features and hence works without access to the model's weights, (b) it is orders of magnitude faster at training time, (c) it is amenable to both supervised and unsupervised training, and (d) it can be even used to align image and text features computed from uni-modal models. To achieve this, we propose Linear Feature Alignment (LFA), a simple linear approach for V-L re-alignment in the target domain. LFA is initialized from a closed-form solution to a least-squares problem and then it is iteratively updated by minimizing a re-ranking loss. Despite its simplicity, our approach can even surpass soft-prompt learning methods as shown by extensive experiments on 11 image and 2 video datasets.

Modern learning frameworks often train deep neural networks with massive amounts of unlabeled data to learn representations by solving simple pretext tasks, then use the representations as foundations for downstream tasks. These networks are empirically designed; as such, they are usually not interpretable, their representations are not structured, and their designs are potentially redundant. White-box deep networks, in which each layer explicitly identifies and transforms structures in the data, present a promising alternative. However, existing white-box architectures have only been shown to work at scale in supervised settings with labeled data, such as classification. In this work, we provide the first instantiation of the white-box design paradigm that can be applied to large-scale unsupervised representation learning. We do this by exploiting a fundamental connection between diffusion, compression, and (masked) completion, deriving a deep transformer-like masked autoencoder architecture, called CRATE-MAE, in which the role of each layer is mathematically fully interpretable: they transform the data distribution to and from a structured representation. Extensive empirical evaluations confirm our analytical insights. CRATE-MAE demonstrates highly promising performance on large-scale imagery datasets while using only ~30% of the parameters compared to the standard masked autoencoder with the same model configuration. The representations learned by CRATE-MAE have explicit structure and also contain semantic meaning. Code is available at https://github.com/Ma-Lab-Berkeley/CRATE .

For general users, training a neural network from scratch is usually challenging and labor-intensive. Fortunately, neural network zoos enable them to find a well-performing model for directly use or fine-tuning it in their local environments. Although current model retrieval solutions attempt to convert neural network models into vectors to avoid complex multiple inference processes required for model selection, it is still difficult to choose a suitable model due to inaccurate vectorization and biased correlation alignment between the query dataset and models. From the perspective of knowledge consistency, i.e., whether the knowledge possessed by the model can meet the needs of query tasks, we propose a model retrieval scheme, named Know2Vec, that acts as a black-box retrieval proxy for model zoo. Know2Vec first accesses to models via a black-box interface in advance, capturing vital decision knowledge from models while ensuring their privacy. Next, it employs an effective encoding technique to transform the knowledge into precise model vectors. Secondly, it maps the user's query task to a knowledge vector by probing the semantic relationships within query samples. Furthermore, the proxy ensures the knowledge-consistency between query vector and model vectors within their alignment space, which is optimized through the supervised learning with diverse loss functions, and finally it can identify the most suitable model for a given task during the inference stage. Extensive experiments show that our Know2Vec achieves superior retrieval accuracy against the state-of-the-art methods in diverse neural network retrieval tasks.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated enhanced capabilities in function-calling, these advancements primarily rely on accessing the functions' responses. This methodology is practical for simpler APIs but faces scalability issues with irreversible APIs that significantly impact the system, such as a database deletion API. Similarly, processes requiring extensive time for each API call and those necessitating forward planning, like automated action pipelines, present complex challenges. Furthermore, scenarios often arise where a generalized approach is needed because algorithms lack direct access to the specific implementations of these functions or secrets to use them. Traditional tool planning methods are inadequate in these cases, compelling the need to operate within black-box environments. Unlike their performance in tool manipulation, LLMs excel in black-box tasks, such as program synthesis. Therefore, we harness the program synthesis capabilities of LLMs to strategize tool usage in black-box settings, ensuring solutions are verified prior to implementation. We introduce TOPGUN, an ingeniously crafted approach leveraging program synthesis for black box tool planning. Accompanied by SwissNYF, a comprehensive suite that integrates black-box algorithms for planning and verification tasks, addressing the aforementioned challenges and enhancing the versatility and effectiveness of LLMs in complex API interactions. The public code for SwissNYF is available at https://github.com/iclr-dummy-user/SwissNYF.

Modern LLMs are increasingly accessed via black-box APIs, requiring users to transmit sensitive prompts, outputs, and fine-tuning data to external providers, creating a critical privacy risk at the API boundary. We introduce AlienLM, a deployable API-only privacy layer that protects text by translating it into an Alien Language via a vocabulary-scale bijection, enabling lossless recovery on the client side. Using only standard fine-tuning APIs, Alien Adaptation Training (AAT) adapts target models to operate directly on alienized inputs. Across four LLM backbones and seven benchmarks, AlienLM retains over 81\% of plaintext-oracle performance on average, substantially outperforming random-bijection and character-level baselines. Under adversaries with access to model weights, corpus statistics, and learning-based inverse translation, recovery attacks reconstruct fewer than 0.22\% of alienized tokens. Our results demonstrate a practical pathway for privacy-preserving LLM deployment under API-only access, substantially reducing plaintext exposure while maintaining task performance.

Retouching images is an essential aspect of enhancing the visual appeal of photos. Although users often share common aesthetic preferences, their retouching methods may vary based on their individual preferences. Therefore, there is a need for white-box approaches that produce satisfying results and enable users to conveniently edit their images simultaneously. Recent white-box retouching methods rely on cascaded global filters that provide image-level filter arguments but cannot perform fine-grained retouching. In contrast, colorists typically employ a divide-and-conquer approach, performing a series of region-specific fine-grained enhancements when using traditional tools like Davinci Resolve. We draw on this insight to develop a white-box framework for photo retouching using parallel region-specific filters, called RSFNet. Our model generates filter arguments (e.g., saturation, contrast, hue) and attention maps of regions for each filter simultaneously. Instead of cascading filters, RSFNet employs linear summations of filters, allowing for a more diverse range of filter classes that can be trained more easily. Our experiments demonstrate that RSFNet achieves state-of-the-art results, offering satisfying aesthetic appeal and increased user convenience for editable white-box retouching.

We propose a new defense mechanism against adversarial attacks inspired by an optical co-processor, providing robustness without compromising natural accuracy in both white-box and black-box settings. This hardware co-processor performs a nonlinear fixed random transformation, where the parameters are unknown and impossible to retrieve with sufficient precision for large enough dimensions. In the white-box setting, our defense works by obfuscating the parameters of the random projection. Unlike other defenses relying on obfuscated gradients, we find we are unable to build a reliable backward differentiable approximation for obfuscated parameters. Moreover, while our model reaches a good natural accuracy with a hybrid backpropagation - synthetic gradient method, the same approach is suboptimal if employed to generate adversarial examples. We find the combination of a random projection and binarization in the optical system also improves robustness against various types of black-box attacks. Finally, our hybrid training method builds robust features against transfer attacks. We demonstrate our approach on a VGG-like architecture, placing the defense on top of the convolutional features, on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Code is available at https://github.com/lightonai/adversarial-robustness-by-design.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Traditional white-box methods for creating adversarial perturbations against LLMs typically rely only on gradient computation from the targeted model, ignoring the internal mechanisms responsible for attack success or failure. Conversely, interpretability studies that analyze these internal mechanisms lack practical applications beyond runtime interventions. We bridge this gap by introducing a novel white-box approach that leverages mechanistic interpretability techniques to craft practical adversarial inputs. Specifically, we first identify acceptance subspaces - sets of feature vectors that do not trigger the model's refusal mechanisms - then use gradient-based optimization to reroute embeddings from refusal subspaces to acceptance subspaces, effectively achieving jailbreaks. This targeted approach significantly reduces computation cost, achieving attack success rates of 80-95\% on state-of-the-art models including Gemma2, Llama3.2, and Qwen2.5 within minutes or even seconds, compared to existing techniques that often fail or require hours of computation. We believe this approach opens a new direction for both attack research and defense development. Furthermore, it showcases a practical application of mechanistic interpretability where other methods are less efficient, which highlights its utility. The code and generated datasets are available at https://github.com/Sckathach/subspace-rerouting.

We question the current evaluation practice on diffusion-based purification methods. Diffusion-based purification methods aim to remove adversarial effects from an input data point at test time. The approach gains increasing attention as an alternative to adversarial training due to the disentangling between training and testing. Well-known white-box attacks are often employed to measure the robustness of the purification. However, it is unknown whether these attacks are the most effective for the diffusion-based purification since the attacks are often tailored for adversarial training. We analyze the current practices and provide a new guideline for measuring the robustness of purification methods against adversarial attacks. Based on our analysis, we further propose a new purification strategy improving robustness compared to the current diffusion-based purification methods.

LLM agents like Claude Code can not only write code but also be used for autonomous AI research and engineering rank2026posttrainbench, novikov2025alphaevolve. We show that an autoresearch-style pipeline karpathy2026autoresearch powered by Claude Code discovers novel white-box adversarial attack algorithms that significantly outperform all existing (30+) methods in jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations. Starting from existing attack implementations, such as GCG~zou2023universal, the agent iterates to produce new algorithms achieving up to 40\% attack success rate on CBRN queries against GPT-OSS-Safeguard-20B, compared to leq10\% for existing algorithms (fig:teaser, left). The discovered algorithms generalize: attacks optimized on surrogate models transfer directly to held-out models, achieving 100\% ASR against Meta-SecAlign-70B chen2025secalign versus 56\% for the best baseline (fig:teaser, middle). Extending the findings of~carlini2025autoadvexbench, our results are an early demonstration that incremental safety and security research can be automated using LLM agents. White-box adversarial red-teaming is particularly well-suited for this: existing methods provide strong starting points, and the optimization objective yields dense, quantitative feedback. We release all discovered attacks alongside baseline implementations and evaluation code at https://github.com/romovpa/claudini.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

The adversarial vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has been well-known and widely concerned, often under the context of learning top-1 attacks (e.g., fooling a DNN to classify a cat image as dog). This paper shows that the concern is much more serious by learning significantly more aggressive ordered top-K clear-box~ This is often referred to as white/black-box attacks in the literature. We choose to adopt neutral terminology, clear/opaque-box attacks in this paper, and omit the prefix clear-box for simplicity. targeted attacks proposed in Adversarial Distillation. We propose a novel and rigorous quadratic programming (QP) method of learning ordered top-K attacks with low computing cost, dubbed as QuadAttacK. Our QuadAttacK directly solves the QP to satisfy the attack constraint in the feature embedding space (i.e., the input space to the final linear classifier), which thus exploits the semantics of the feature embedding space (i.e., the principle of class coherence). With the optimized feature embedding vector perturbation, it then computes the adversarial perturbation in the data space via the vanilla one-step back-propagation. In experiments, the proposed QuadAttacK is tested in the ImageNet-1k classification using ResNet-50, DenseNet-121, and Vision Transformers (ViT-B and DEiT-S). It successfully pushes the boundary of successful ordered top-K attacks from K=10 up to K=20 at a cheap budget (1times 60) and further improves attack success rates for K=5 for all tested models, while retaining the performance for K=1.

A popular class of defenses against prompt injection attacks on large language models (LLMs) relies on fine-tuning to separate instructions and data, so that the LLM does not follow instructions that might be present with data. We evaluate the robustness of this approach in the whitebox setting by constructing strong optimization-based attacks, and show that the defenses do not provide the claimed security properties. Specifically, we construct a novel attention-based attack algorithm for textual LLMs and apply it to three recent whitebox defenses SecAlign (CCS 2025), SecAlign++, and StruQ (USENIX Security 2025), showing attacks with success rates of up to 85-95\% on unseen prompts with modest increase in attacker budget in terms of tokens. Our findings make fundamental progress towards understanding the robustness of prompt injection defenses in the whitebox setting. We release our code and attacks at https://github.com/nishitvp/better_opts_attacks

Deep neural networks learn fragile "shortcut" features, rendering them difficult to interpret (black box) and vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This paper proposes semantic features as a general architectural solution to this problem. The main idea is to make features locality-sensitive in the adequate semantic topology of the domain, thus introducing a strong regularization. The proof of concept network is lightweight, inherently interpretable and achieves almost human-level adversarial test metrics - with no adversarial training! These results and the general nature of the approach warrant further research on semantic features. The code is available at https://github.com/314-Foundation/white-box-nn

Numerous companies have started offering services based on large language models (LLM), such as ChatGPT, which inevitably raises privacy concerns as users' prompts are exposed to the model provider. Previous research on secure reasoning using multi-party computation (MPC) has proven to be impractical for LLM applications due to its time-consuming and communication-intensive nature. While lightweight anonymization techniques can protect private information in prompts through substitution or masking, they fail to recover sensitive data replaced in the LLM-generated results. In this paper, we expand the application scenarios of anonymization techniques by training a small local model to de-anonymize the LLM's returned results with minimal computational overhead. We introduce the HaS framework, where "H(ide)" and "S(eek)" represent its two core processes: hiding private entities for anonymization and seeking private entities for de-anonymization, respectively. To quantitatively assess HaS's privacy protection performance, we propose both black-box and white-box adversarial models. Furthermore, we conduct experiments to evaluate HaS's usability in translation and classification tasks. The experimental findings demonstrate that the HaS framework achieves an optimal balance between privacy protection and utility.

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

Deep learning offers state of the art solutions for image recognition. However, deep models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in images that are subtle but significantly change the model's prediction. In a white-box attack, these perturbations are generally learned for deep models that operate on RGB images and, hence, the perturbations are equally distributed in the RGB color space. In this paper, we show that the adversarial perturbations prevail in the Y-channel of the YCbCr space. Our finding is motivated from the fact that the human vision and deep models are more responsive to shape and texture rather than color. Based on our finding, we propose a defense against adversarial images. Our defence, coined ResUpNet, removes perturbations only from the Y-channel by exploiting ResNet features in an upsampling framework without the need for a bottleneck. At the final stage, the untouched CbCr-channels are combined with the refined Y-channel to restore the clean image. Note that ResUpNet is model agnostic as it does not modify the DNN structure. ResUpNet is trained end-to-end in Pytorch and the results are compared to existing defence techniques in the input transformation category. Our results show that our approach achieves the best balance between defence against adversarial attacks such as FGSM, PGD and DDN and maintaining the original accuracies of VGG-16, ResNet50 and DenseNet121 on clean images. We perform another experiment to show that learning adversarial perturbations only for the Y-channel results in higher fooling rates for the same perturbation magnitude.

We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.

We present H-Node Adversarial Noise Cancellation (H-Node ANC), a mechanistic framework that identifies, exploits, and defends hallucination representations in transformer-based large language models (LLMs) at the level of individual hidden-state dimensions. A logistic regression probe trained on last-token hidden states localizes hallucination signal to a small set of high-variance dimensions -- termed Hallucination Nodes (H-Nodes) -- with probe AUC reaching 0.90 across four architectures. A white-box adversarial attack amplifies these dimensions at inference time via a real-time forward hook, achieving a selectivity of 3.02x with less than 10% visibility to the defender. Adaptive ANC defense suppresses H-Node excess in-pass using confidence-weighted cancellation, reducing grounded activation drift by 33-42% over static cancellation. A dynamic iterative extension that re-ranks cancellation targets across successive passes recovers up to 0.69 robustness from a single-pass baseline of 8%. All contributions are validated on OPT-125M, Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 (125M-8B parameters). Perplexity impact is surgical (<5%) and MMLU degradation is at most 3%, confirming that the defense does not impair general reasoning capability.

We construct targeted audio adversarial examples on automatic speech recognition. Given any audio waveform, we can produce another that is over 99.9% similar, but transcribes as any phrase we choose (recognizing up to 50 characters per second of audio). We apply our white-box iterative optimization-based attack to Mozilla's implementation DeepSpeech end-to-end, and show it has a 100% success rate. The feasibility of this attack introduce a new domain to study adversarial examples.

Most existing works of adversarial samples focus on attacking image recognition models, while little attention is paid to the image retrieval task. In this paper, we identify two inherent challenges in applying prevailing image recognition attack methods to image retrieval. First, image retrieval demands discriminative visual features, which is significantly different from the one-hot class prediction in image recognition. Second, due to the disjoint and potentially unrelated classes between the training and test set in image retrieval, predicting the query category from predefined training classes is not accurate and leads to a sub-optimal adversarial gradient. To address these limitations, we propose a new white-box attack approach, Opposite-Direction Feature Attack (ODFA), to generate adversarial queries. Opposite-Direction Feature Attack (ODFA) effectively exploits feature-level adversarial gradients and takes advantage of feature distance in the representation space. To our knowledge, we are among the early attempts to design an attack method specifically for image retrieval. When we deploy an attacked image as the query, the true matches are prone to receive low ranks. We demonstrate through extensive experiments that (1) only crafting adversarial queries is sufficient to fool the state-of-the-art retrieval systems; (2) the proposed attack method, ODFA, leads to a higher attack success rate than classification attack methods, validating the necessity of leveraging characteristics of image retrieval; (3) the adversarial queries generated by our method have good transferability to other retrieval models without accessing their parameters, i.e.,the black-box setting.

White balance (WB) is one of the first photo-finishing steps used to render a captured image to its final output. WB is applied to remove the color cast caused by the scene's illumination. Interactive photo-editing software allows users to manually select different regions in a photo as examples of the illumination for WB correction (e.g., clicking on achromatic objects). Such interactive editing is possible only with images saved in a RAW image format. This is because RAW images have no photo-rendering operations applied and photo-editing software is able to apply WB and other photo-finishing procedures to render the final image. Interactively editing WB in camera-rendered images is significantly more challenging. This is because the camera hardware has already applied WB to the image and subsequent nonlinear photo-processing routines. These nonlinear rendering operations make it difficult to change the WB post-capture. The goal of this paper is to allow interactive WB manipulation of camera-rendered images. The proposed method is an extension of our recent work afifi2019color that proposed a post-capture method for WB correction based on nonlinear color-mapping functions. Here, we introduce a new framework that links the nonlinear color-mapping functions directly to user-selected colors to enable {\it interactive} WB manipulation. This new framework is also more efficient in terms of memory and run-time (99\% reduction in memory and 3times speed-up). Lastly, we describe how our framework can leverage a simple illumination estimation method (i.e., gray-world) to perform auto-WB correction that is on a par with the WB correction results in afifi2019color. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/mahmoudnafifi/Interactive_WB_correction.

We study secret elicitation: discovering knowledge that an AI possesses but does not explicitly verbalize. As a testbed, we train three families of large language models (LLMs) to possess specific knowledge that they apply downstream but deny knowing when asked directly. For example, in one setting, we train an LLM to generate replies that are consistent with knowing the user is female, while denying this knowledge when asked directly. We then design various black-box and white-box secret elicitation techniques and evaluate them based on whether they can help an LLM auditor successfully guess the secret knowledge. Many of our techniques improve on simple baselines. Our most effective techniques (performing best in 2/3 settings) are based on prefill attacks, a black-box technique where the LLM reveals secret knowledge when generating a completion from a predefined prefix. In our remaining setting, white-box techniques based on logit lens and sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are most effective. We release our models and code, establishing a public benchmark for evaluating secret elicitation methods.

Deep learning models are susceptible to adversarial samples in white and black-box environments. Although previous studies have shown high attack success rates, coupling DNN models with interpretation models could offer a sense of security when a human expert is involved, who can identify whether a given sample is benign or malicious. However, in white-box environments, interpretable deep learning systems (IDLSes) have been shown to be vulnerable to malicious manipulations. In black-box settings, as access to the components of IDLSes is limited, it becomes more challenging for the adversary to fool the system. In this work, we propose a Query-efficient Score-based black-box attack against IDLSes, QuScore, which requires no knowledge of the target model and its coupled interpretation model. QuScore is based on transfer-based and score-based methods by employing an effective microbial genetic algorithm. Our method is designed to reduce the number of queries necessary to carry out successful attacks, resulting in a more efficient process. By continuously refining the adversarial samples created based on feedback scores from the IDLS, our approach effectively navigates the search space to identify perturbations that can fool the system. We evaluate the attack's effectiveness on four CNN models (Inception, ResNet, VGG, DenseNet) and two interpretation models (CAM, Grad), using both ImageNet and CIFAR datasets. Our results show that the proposed approach is query-efficient with a high attack success rate that can reach between 95% and 100% and transferability with an average success rate of 69% in the ImageNet and CIFAR datasets. Our attack method generates adversarial examples with attribution maps that resemble benign samples. We have also demonstrated that our attack is resilient against various preprocessing defense techniques and can easily be transferred to different DNN models.

Provenance watermarking is increasingly treated as a safeguard for synthetic speech, whether built directly into speech-generation models such as Chatterbox, provided through dedicated techniques such as AudioSeal, or deployed by commercial platforms such as ElevenLabs. We identify a previously uncharacterized liability: when synthetic speech is watermarked and human speech is not, detectors trained alongside latch onto the watermark as a spurious "watermark => fake" shortcut. This single feature yields three coupled failures: generalization degradation (model performance deteriorates on unseen data), strip-to-evade (a watermarked fake escapes once unwatermarked), and mark-to-frame (watermarking a real voice flags it as fake). In a controlled white-box experiment, a watermark-trained detector shows all three (for example, mark-to-frame lifts Equal Error Rate from 16% to 75%). In a black-box test of a commercial API, we show that adding a watermark to real speech disguises it as fake. However, this shortcut is fixable: retraining with the watermark on both classes decorrelates it and restores clean behavior. We release experiment data as a paired clean-versus-watermarked corpus (WASP).

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to evade the detector. Prior work has studied obfuscation only in artificial settings where models were directly rewarded for harmful output. We construct a realistic coding environment where reward hacking via hardcoding test cases naturally occurs, and show that obfuscation emerges in this setting. We introduce a taxonomy of possible outcomes when training against a deception detector. The model either remains honest, or becomes deceptive via two possible obfuscation strategies. (i) Obfuscated activations: the model outputs deceptive text while modifying its internal representations to no longer trigger the detector. (ii) Obfuscated policy: the model outputs deceptive text that evades the detector, typically by including a justification for the reward hack. Empirically, obfuscated activations arise from representation drift during RL, with or without a detector penalty. The probe penalty only incentivizes obfuscated policies; we theoretically show this is expected for policy gradient methods. Sufficiently high KL regularization and detector penalty can yield honest policies, establishing white-box deception detectors as viable training signals for tasks prone to reward hacking.

The expansion of text-to-image diffusion models has raised concerns about harmful outputs, from fabricated depictions of public figures to sexually explicit imagery. To mitigate such risks, prior work has proposed concept erasure methods that aim to sever unwanted concepts from the model via fine-tuning, yet it remains unclear whether these approaches truly remove all links to the harmful concept or merely conceal superficial connections. In this work, we reveal a critical vulnerability, the Erasure Evasion Backdoor (EEB): an adversary binds a backdoor trigger to a concept slated for removal, and this malicious link survives subsequent erasure. We show that both black-box and white-box adversaries can instantiate this threat. Across six state-of-the-art erasure methods, including robust ones that explicitly search for alternative representations of the target concept, EEB consistently exposes harmful content: up to 82% success against celebrity-identity unlearning, up to 94% for object erasure, and up to 16 times amplification of explicit-content exposure. While EEB uncovers a blind spot in current erasure methods, it also provides a diagnostic tool for stress-testing future concept erasure techniques.

The study of adversarial vulnerabilities of deep neural networks (DNNs) has progressed rapidly. Existing attacks require either internal access (to the architecture, parameters, or training set of the victim model) or external access (to query the model). However, both the access may be infeasible or expensive in many scenarios. We investigate no-box adversarial examples, where the attacker can neither access the model information or the training set nor query the model. Instead, the attacker can only gather a small number of examples from the same problem domain as that of the victim model. Such a stronger threat model greatly expands the applicability of adversarial attacks. We propose three mechanisms for training with a very small dataset (on the order of tens of examples) and find that prototypical reconstruction is the most effective. Our experiments show that adversarial examples crafted on prototypical auto-encoding models transfer well to a variety of image classification and face verification models. On a commercial celebrity recognition system held by clarifai.com, our approach significantly diminishes the average prediction accuracy of the system to only 15.40%, which is on par with the attack that transfers adversarial examples from a pre-trained Arcface model.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

Recent text-to-image diffusion models have demonstrated an astonishing capacity to generate high-quality images. However, researchers mainly studied the way of synthesizing images with only text prompts. While some works have explored using other modalities as conditions, considerable paired data, e.g., box/mask-image pairs, and fine-tuning time are required for nurturing models. As such paired data is time-consuming and labor-intensive to acquire and restricted to a closed set, this potentially becomes the bottleneck for applications in an open world. This paper focuses on the simplest form of user-provided conditions, e.g., box or scribble. To mitigate the aforementioned problem, we propose a training-free method to control objects and contexts in the synthesized images adhering to the given spatial conditions. Specifically, three spatial constraints, i.e., Inner-Box, Outer-Box, and Corner Constraints, are designed and seamlessly integrated into the denoising step of diffusion models, requiring no additional training and massive annotated layout data. Extensive results show that the proposed constraints can control what and where to present in the images while retaining the ability of the Stable Diffusion model to synthesize with high fidelity and diverse concept coverage. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/Sierkinhane/BoxDiff.

Transformer-like models for vision tasks have recently proven effective for a wide range of downstream applications such as segmentation and detection. Previous works have shown that segmentation properties emerge in vision transformers (ViTs) trained using self-supervised methods such as DINO, but not in those trained on supervised classification tasks. In this study, we probe whether segmentation emerges in transformer-based models solely as a result of intricate self-supervised learning mechanisms, or if the same emergence can be achieved under much broader conditions through proper design of the model architecture. Through extensive experimental results, we demonstrate that when employing a white-box transformer-like architecture known as CRATE, whose design explicitly models and pursues low-dimensional structures in the data distribution, segmentation properties, at both the whole and parts levels, already emerge with a minimalistic supervised training recipe. Layer-wise finer-grained analysis reveals that the emergent properties strongly corroborate the designed mathematical functions of the white-box network. Our results suggest a path to design white-box foundation models that are simultaneously highly performant and mathematically fully interpretable. Code is at https://github.com/Ma-Lab-Berkeley/CRATE.

Promptable segmentation models such as SAM have established a powerful paradigm, enabling strong generalization to unseen objects and domains with minimal user input, including points, bounding boxes, and text prompts. Among these, bounding boxes stand out as particularly effective, often outperforming points while significantly reducing annotation costs. However, current training and evaluation protocols typically rely on synthetic prompts generated through simple heuristics, offering limited insight into real-world robustness. In this paper, we investigate the robustness of promptable segmentation models to natural variations in bounding box prompts. First, we conduct a controlled user study and collect thousands of real bounding box annotations. Our analysis reveals substantial variability in segmentation quality across users for the same model and instance, indicating that SAM-like models are highly sensitive to natural prompt noise. Then, since exhaustive testing of all possible user inputs is computationally prohibitive, we reformulate robustness evaluation as a white-box optimization problem over the bounding box prompt space. We introduce BREPS, a method for generating adversarial bounding boxes that minimize or maximize segmentation error while adhering to naturalness constraints. Finally, we benchmark state-of-the-art models across 10 datasets, spanning everyday scenes to medical imaging. Code - https://github.com/emb-ai/BREPS.

In the evolving landscape of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, the remarkable capability to generate high-quality images from textual descriptions faces challenges with the potential misuse of reproducing sensitive content. To address this critical issue, we introduce Robust Adversarial Concept Erase (RACE), a novel approach designed to mitigate these risks by enhancing the robustness of concept erasure method for T2I models. RACE utilizes a sophisticated adversarial training framework to identify and mitigate adversarial text embeddings, significantly reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR). Impressively, RACE achieves a 30 percentage point reduction in ASR for the ``nudity'' concept against the leading white-box attack method. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate RACE's effectiveness in defending against both white-box and black-box attacks, marking a significant advancement in protecting T2I diffusion models from generating inappropriate or misleading imagery. This work underlines the essential need for proactive defense measures in adapting to the rapidly advancing field of adversarial challenges. Our code is publicly available: https://github.com/chkimmmmm/R.A.C.E.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

We introduce the Adversarial Confusion Attack, a new class of threats against multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Unlike jailbreaks or targeted misclassification, the goal is to induce systematic disruption that makes the model generate incoherent or confidently incorrect outputs. Practical applications include embedding such adversarial images into websites to prevent MLLM-powered AI Agents from operating reliably. The proposed attack maximizes next-token entropy using a small ensemble of open-source MLLMs. In the white-box setting, we show that a single adversarial image can disrupt all models in the ensemble, both in the full-image and Adversarial CAPTCHA settings. Despite relying on a basic adversarial technique (PGD), the attack generates perturbations that transfer to both unseen open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) and proprietary (e.g., GPT-5.1) models.

Modern machine learning systems use models trained on ever-growing corpora. Typically, metadata such as ownership, access control, or licensing information is ignored during training. Instead, to mitigate privacy risks, we rely on generic techniques such as dataset sanitization and differentially private model training, with inherent privacy/utility trade-offs that hurt model performance. Moreover, these techniques have limitations in scenarios where sensitive information is shared across multiple participants and fine-grained access control is required. By ignoring metadata, we therefore miss an opportunity to better address security, privacy, and confidentiality challenges. In this paper, we take an information flow control perspective to describe machine learning systems, which allows us to leverage metadata such as access control policies and define clear-cut privacy and confidentiality guarantees with interpretable information flows. Under this perspective, we contrast two different approaches to achieve user-level non-interference: 1) fine-tuning per-user models, and 2) retrieval augmented models that access user-specific datasets at inference time. We compare these two approaches to a trivially non-interfering zero-shot baseline using a public model and to a baseline that fine-tunes this model on the whole corpus. We evaluate trained models on two datasets of scientific articles and demonstrate that retrieval augmented architectures deliver the best utility, scalability, and flexibility while satisfying strict non-interference guarantees.

Activation steering is a popular white-box control technique that modifies model activations to elicit an abstract change in its behavior. It has also become a standard tool in interpretability (e.g., probing truthfulness, or translating activations into human-readable explanations) and safety research (e.g., jailbreakability). However, it is unclear whether steered behavior is realizable by any textual prompt. In this work, we cast this question as a surjectivity problem: for a fixed model, does every steered activation admit a preimage under the model's natural forward pass? Under practical assumptions, we prove that activation steering pushes the residual stream off the manifold of states reachable from discrete prompts. Almost surely, no prompt can reproduce the same internal behavior induced by steering. We also illustrate this finding empirically across three widely used LLMs. Our results establish a formal separation between white-box steerability and black-box prompting. We therefore caution against interpreting the ease and success of activation steering as evidence of prompt-based interpretability or vulnerability, and argue for evaluation protocols that explicitly decouple white-box and black-box interventions.

Generative AI release decisions determine whether system components are made available, but release does not address many other elements that change how users and stakeholders are able to engage with a system. Beyond release, access to system components informs potential risks and benefits. Access refers to practical needs, infrastructurally, technically, and societally, in order to use available components in some way. We deconstruct access along three axes: resourcing, technical usability, and utility. Within each category, a set of variables per system component clarify tradeoffs. For example, resourcing requires access to computing infrastructure to serve model weights. We also compare the accessibility of four high performance language models, two open-weight and two closed-weight, showing similar considerations for all based instead on access variables. Access variables set the foundation for being able to scale or increase access to users; we examine the scale of access and how scale affects ability to manage and intervene on risks. This framework better encompasses the landscape and risk-benefit tradeoffs of system releases to inform system release decisions, research, and policy.

Despite tremendous success in many application scenarios, the training and inference costs of using deep learning are also rapidly increasing over time. The lottery ticket hypothesis (LTH) emerges as a promising framework to leverage a special sparse subnetwork (i.e., winning ticket) instead of a full model for both training and inference, that can lower both costs without sacrificing the performance. The main resource bottleneck of LTH is however the extraordinary cost to find the sparse mask of the winning ticket. That makes the found winning ticket become a valuable asset to the owners, highlighting the necessity of protecting its copyright. Our setting adds a new dimension to the recently soaring interest in protecting against the intellectual property (IP) infringement of deep models and verifying their ownerships, since they take owners' massive/unique resources to develop or train. While existing methods explored encrypted weights or predictions, we investigate a unique way to leverage sparse topological information to perform lottery verification, by developing several graph-based signatures that can be embedded as credentials. By further combining trigger set-based methods, our proposal can work in both white-box and black-box verification scenarios. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of lottery verification in diverse models (ResNet-20, ResNet-18, ResNet-50) on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Specifically, our verification is shown to be robust to removal attacks such as model fine-tuning and pruning, as well as several ambiguity attacks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/NO-stealing-LTH.

Semantic segmentation is a fundamental visual task that finds extensive deployment in applications with security-sensitive considerations. Nonetheless, recent work illustrates the adversarial vulnerability of semantic segmentation models to white-box attacks. However, its adversarial robustness against black-box attacks has not been fully explored. In this paper, we present the first exploration of black-box decision-based attacks on semantic segmentation. First, we analyze the challenges that semantic segmentation brings to decision-based attacks through the case study. Then, to address these challenges, we first propose a decision-based attack on semantic segmentation, called Discrete Linear Attack (DLA). Based on random search and proxy index, we utilize the discrete linear noises for perturbation exploration and calibration to achieve efficient attack efficiency. We conduct adversarial robustness evaluation on 5 models from Cityscapes and ADE20K under 8 attacks. DLA shows its formidable power on Cityscapes by dramatically reducing PSPNet's mIoU from an impressive 77.83% to a mere 2.14% with just 50 queries.

Interactive segmentation methods rely on user inputs to iteratively update the selection mask. A click specifying the object of interest is arguably the most simple and intuitive interaction type, and thereby the most common choice for interactive segmentation. However, user clicking patterns in the interactive segmentation context remain unexplored. Accordingly, interactive segmentation evaluation strategies rely more on intuition and common sense rather than empirical studies (e.g., assuming that users tend to click in the center of the area with the largest error). In this work, we conduct a real user study to investigate real user clicking patterns. This study reveals that the intuitive assumption made in the common evaluation strategy may not hold. As a result, interactive segmentation models may show high scores in the standard benchmarks, but it does not imply that they would perform well in a real world scenario. To assess the applicability of interactive segmentation methods, we propose a novel evaluation strategy providing a more comprehensive analysis of a model's performance. To this end, we propose a methodology for finding extreme user inputs by a direct optimization in a white-box adversarial attack on the interactive segmentation model. Based on the performance with such adversarial user inputs, we assess the robustness of interactive segmentation models w.r.t click positions. Besides, we introduce a novel benchmark for measuring the robustness of interactive segmentation, and report the results of an extensive evaluation of dozens of models.

Generative world models (WMs) are increasingly used to synthesize controllable, sensor-conditioned driving videos, yet their reliance on physical priors exposes novel attack surfaces. In this paper, we present Physical-Conditioned World Model Attack (PhysCond-WMA), the first white-box world model attack that perturbs physical-condition channels, such as HDMap embeddings and 3D-box features, to induce semantic, logic, or decision-level distortion while preserving perceptual fidelity. PhysCond-WMA is optimized in two stages: (1) a quality-preserving guidance stage that constrains reverse-diffusion loss below a calibrated threshold, and (2) a momentum-guided denoising stage that accumulates target-aligned gradients along the denoising trajectory for stable, temporally coherent semantic shifts. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach remains effective while increasing FID by about 9% on average and FVD by about 3.9% on average. Under the targeted attack setting, the attack success rate (ASR) reaches 0.55. Downstream studies further show tangible risk, which using attacked videos for training decreases 3D detection performance by about 4%, and worsens open-loop planning performance by about 20%. These findings has for the first time revealed and quantified security vulnerabilities in generative world models, driving more comprehensive security checkers.

Vision-language pre-training (VLP) models have shown vulnerability to adversarial examples in multimodal tasks. Furthermore, malicious adversaries can be deliberately transferred to attack other black-box models. However, existing work has mainly focused on investigating white-box attacks. In this paper, we present the first study to investigate the adversarial transferability of recent VLP models. We observe that existing methods exhibit much lower transferability, compared to the strong attack performance in white-box settings. The transferability degradation is partly caused by the under-utilization of cross-modal interactions. Particularly, unlike unimodal learning, VLP models rely heavily on cross-modal interactions and the multimodal alignments are many-to-many, e.g., an image can be described in various natural languages. To this end, we propose a highly transferable Set-level Guidance Attack (SGA) that thoroughly leverages modality interactions and incorporates alignment-preserving augmentation with cross-modal guidance. Experimental results demonstrate that SGA could generate adversarial examples that can strongly transfer across different VLP models on multiple downstream vision-language tasks. On image-text retrieval, SGA significantly enhances the attack success rate for transfer attacks from ALBEF to TCL by a large margin (at least 9.78% and up to 30.21%), compared to the state-of-the-art.

Previous work has suggested that preprocessing images through lossy compression can defend against adversarial perturbations, but comprehensive attack evaluations have been lacking. In this paper, we construct strong white-box and adaptive attacks against various compression models and identify a critical challenge for attackers: high realism in reconstructed images significantly increases attack difficulty. Through rigorous evaluation across multiple attack scenarios, we demonstrate that compression models capable of producing realistic, high-fidelity reconstructions are substantially more resistant to our attacks. In contrast, low-realism compression models can be broken. Our analysis reveals that this is not due to gradient masking. Rather, realistic reconstructions maintaining distributional alignment with natural images seem to offer inherent robustness. This work highlights a significant obstacle for future adversarial attacks and suggests that developing more effective techniques to overcome realism represents an essential challenge for comprehensive security evaluation.

In this paper, we contend that a natural objective of representation learning is to compress and transform the distribution of the data, say sets of tokens, towards a low-dimensional Gaussian mixture supported on incoherent subspaces. The goodness of such a representation can be evaluated by a principled measure, called sparse rate reduction, that simultaneously maximizes the intrinsic information gain and extrinsic sparsity of the learned representation. From this perspective, popular deep network architectures, including transformers, can be viewed as realizing iterative schemes to optimize this measure. Particularly, we derive a transformer block from alternating optimization on parts of this objective: the multi-head self-attention operator compresses the representation by implementing an approximate gradient descent step on the coding rate of the features, and the subsequent multi-layer perceptron sparsifies the features. This leads to a family of white-box transformer-like deep network architectures, named CRATE, which are mathematically fully interpretable. We show, by way of a novel connection between denoising and compression, that the inverse to the aforementioned compressive encoding can be realized by the same class of CRATE architectures. Thus, the so-derived white-box architectures are universal to both encoders and decoders. Experiments show that these networks, despite their simplicity, indeed learn to compress and sparsify representations of large-scale real-world image and text datasets, and achieve performance very close to highly engineered transformer-based models: ViT, MAE, DINO, BERT, and GPT2. We believe the proposed computational framework demonstrates great potential in bridging the gap between theory and practice of deep learning, from a unified perspective of data compression. Code is available at: https://ma-lab-berkeley.github.io/CRATE .

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, their trustworthiness has become a critical concern. However, in dependency recommendation scenarios, the reliability of LLMs is undermined by widespread package hallucinations, where models often recommend hallucinated packages. Recent studies have proposed a range of approaches to mitigate this issue. Nevertheless, existing approaches typically merely reduce hallucination rates rather than eliminate them, leaving persistent software security risks. In this work, we argue that package hallucinations are theoretically preventable based on the key insight that package validity is decidable through finite and enumerable authoritative package lists. Building on this, we propose PackMonitor, the first approach capable of fundamentally eliminating package hallucinations by continuously monitoring the model's decoding process and intervening when necessary. To implement this in practice, PackMonitor addresses three key challenges: (1) determining when to trigger intervention via a Context-Aware Parser that continuously monitors model outputs and selectively activates intervening only during installation command generation; (2) resolving how to intervene by employing a Package-Name Intervenor that strictly limits the decoding space to an authoritative package list; and (3) ensuring monitoring efficiency through a DFA-Caching Mechanism that enables scalability to millions of packages with negligible overhead. Extensive experiments on five widely used LLMs demonstrate that PackMonitor is a training-free, plug-and-play solution that consistently reduces package hallucination rates to zero while maintaining low-latency inference and preserving original model capabilities.

Deep learning (DL) systems are increasingly deployed in safety- and security-critical domains including self-driving cars and malware detection, where the correctness and predictability of a system's behavior for corner case inputs are of great importance. Existing DL testing depends heavily on manually labeled data and therefore often fails to expose erroneous behaviors for rare inputs. We design, implement, and evaluate DeepXplore, the first whitebox framework for systematically testing real-world DL systems. First, we introduce neuron coverage for systematically measuring the parts of a DL system exercised by test inputs. Next, we leverage multiple DL systems with similar functionality as cross-referencing oracles to avoid manual checking. Finally, we demonstrate how finding inputs for DL systems that both trigger many differential behaviors and achieve high neuron coverage can be represented as a joint optimization problem and solved efficiently using gradient-based search techniques. DeepXplore efficiently finds thousands of incorrect corner case behaviors (e.g., self-driving cars crashing into guard rails and malware masquerading as benign software) in state-of-the-art DL models with thousands of neurons trained on five popular datasets including ImageNet and Udacity self-driving challenge data. For all tested DL models, on average, DeepXplore generated one test input demonstrating incorrect behavior within one second while running only on a commodity laptop. We further show that the test inputs generated by DeepXplore can also be used to retrain the corresponding DL model to improve the model's accuracy by up to 3%.

As text-to-image generative models advance, they raise critical safety concerns, particularly the generation of Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content such as violence and nudity, further exacerbated by red-teaming adversarial attacks. Existing defenses predominantly operate under white-box assumptions, relying on text encoder optimization, weight editing, or inference-time intervention, and fundamentally cannot scale to proprietary models. Black-box alternatives based on LLM prompt rewriting offer broader applicability, yet fail in a critical regime we identify as the benign adversarial problem: prompts that are linguistically safe but still trigger harmful generation due to the model's learned data distribution. We propose DiSCO, a zero-shot, strictly black-box defense that operates entirely at the prompt level as a plug-and-play module, requiring no model retraining, fine-tuning, or access to model internals. DiSCO performs distribution-guided suffix expansion via beam search, optimized through contrastive scoring over safe and unsafe image pools generated by the target model itself, with iterative adaptive feedback until safe content is produced. We demonstrate that DiSCO consistently enhances the safety of both undefended and defended models on the I2P benchmark under multiple red-teaming attacks, achieving 37.7% and 25.13% ASR reduction, respectively, while maintaining semantic fidelity and improving image coherence. As a black-box, architecture-agnostic module, DiSCO can be readily applied to any text-to-image system without necessitating any changes to the model itself.

Content watermarking is an important tool for the authentication and copyright protection of digital media. However, it is unclear whether existing watermarks are robust against adversarial attacks. We present the winning solution to the NeurIPS 2024 Erasing the Invisible challenge, which stress-tests watermark robustness under varying degrees of adversary knowledge. The challenge consisted of two tracks: a black-box and beige-box track, depending on whether the adversary knows which watermarking method was used by the provider. For the beige-box track, we leverage an adaptive VAE-based evasion attack, with a test-time optimization and color-contrast restoration in CIELAB space to preserve the image's quality. For the black-box track, we first cluster images based on their artifacts in the spatial or frequency-domain. Then, we apply image-to-image diffusion models with controlled noise injection and semantic priors from ChatGPT-generated captions to each cluster with optimized parameter settings. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that our method successfully achieves near-perfect watermark removal (95.7%) with negligible impact on the residual image's quality. We hope that our attacks inspire the development of more robust image watermarking methods.

As visual assistant systems powered by visual language models (VLMs) become more prevalent, concerns over user privacy have grown, particularly for blind and low vision users who may unknowingly capture personal private information in their images. Existing privacy protection methods rely on coarse-grained segmentation, which uniformly masks entire private objects, often at the cost of usability. In this work, we propose FiGPriv, a fine-grained privacy protection framework that selectively masks only high-risk private information while preserving low-risk information. Our approach integrates fine-grained segmentation with a data-driven risk scoring mechanism. We evaluate our framework using the BIV-Priv-Seg dataset and show that FiG-Priv preserves +26% of image content, enhancing the ability of VLMs to provide useful responses by 11% and identify the image content by 45%, while ensuring privacy protection. Project Page: https://artcs1.github.io/VLMPrivacy/

In this paper, we propose LEURN: a neural network architecture that learns univariate decision rules. LEURN is a white-box algorithm that results into univariate trees and makes explainable decisions in every stage. In each layer, LEURN finds a set of univariate rules based on an embedding of the previously checked rules and their corresponding responses. Both rule finding and final decision mechanisms are weighted linear combinations of these embeddings, hence contribution of all rules are clearly formulated and explainable. LEURN can select features, extract feature importance, provide semantic similarity between a pair of samples, be used in a generative manner and can give a confidence score. Thanks to a smoothness parameter, LEURN can also controllably behave like decision trees or vanilla neural networks. Besides these advantages, LEURN achieves comparable performance to state-of-the-art methods across 30 tabular datasets for classification and regression problems.

Directional ablation removes an aligned language model's ability to refuse by projecting a single "refusal direction" out of the weights that write the residual stream. It needs no gradient-based training and no optimization, only a few hundred contrastive prompts, which makes it the canonical white-box attack on open-weight alignment. However, it has been established only on dense models up to roughly 70B parameters. We study whether it survives the shift to frontier mixture-of-experts (MoE) models whose residual streams are no longer a single tensor and whose weights ship quantized. We apply it to GLM-5.3-Flash (320B parameters, 288 routed experts, a four-wide hyper-connection residual, block-FP8). The attack survives the architecture, but what it reaches is no longer where a reader of the original recipe would look for it. Editing the attention, dense and routed-expert writers on their own removes 0.039, 0.016 and 0.148 of refusal respectively; editing all three together removes 0.776. As a result, 74% of the effect exists only under the joint intervention. The part the conventional recipe reaches by module-name matching accounts for 0.066 of that 0.776, which is why it fails silently on an MoE. The effect does not follow from removing just any direction: ablating a random direction orthogonal to it leaves refusal unchanged. A category-concentrated residue survives every edit we tried: subspaces fitted on violence, sexual content and hate leave measurable refusal at every rank from 1 to 12. We report the method, the 41-89 percentage-point reductions it achieves across seven harmful benchmarks with no detected change in capability, and the boundary where it stops.

Recently, LoRA and its variants have become the de facto strategy for training and sharing task-specific versions of large pretrained models, thanks to their efficiency and simplicity. However, the issue of copyright protection for LoRA weights, especially through watermark-based techniques, remains underexplored. To address this gap, we propose SEAL (SEcure wAtermarking on LoRA weights), the universal whitebox watermarking for LoRA. SEAL embeds a secret, non-trainable matrix between trainable LoRA weights, serving as a passport to claim ownership. SEAL then entangles the passport with the LoRA weights through training, without extra loss for entanglement, and distributes the finetuned weights after hiding the passport. When applying SEAL, we observed no performance degradation across commonsense reasoning, textual/visual instruction tuning, and text-to-image synthesis tasks. We demonstrate that SEAL is robust against a variety of known attacks: removal, obfuscation, and ambiguity attacks.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly integrated into privacy-critical domains, yet existing evaluations of personally identifiable information (PII) leakage largely treat privacy as a static extraction task and ignore how a subject's online presence--the volume of their data available online--influences privacy alignment. We introduce PII-VisBench, a novel benchmark containing 4000 unique probes designed to evaluate VLM safety through the continuum of online presence. The benchmark stratifies 200 subjects into four visibility categories: high, medium, low, and zero--based on the extent and nature of their information available online. We evaluate 18 open-source VLMs (0.3B-32B) based on two key metrics: percentage of PII probing queries refused (Refusal Rate) and the fraction of non-refusal responses flagged for containing PII (Conditional PII Disclosure Rate). Across models, we observe a consistent pattern: refusals increase and PII disclosures decrease (9.10% high to 5.34% low) as subject visibility drops. We identify that models are more likely to disclose PII for high-visibility subjects, alongside substantial model-family heterogeneity and PII-type disparities. Finally, paraphrasing and jailbreak-style prompts expose attack and model-dependent failures, motivating visibility-aware safety evaluation and training interventions.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

Recent advancements in Image-to-Video (I2V) generation have transformed input images from simple appearance references into interactive control interfaces where visual cues such as arrows, sketches, and emojis orchestrate complex video dynamics with unprecedented controllability. However, these seemingly innocuous static cues can be interpreted by models as executable temporal instructions, unfolding into harmful actions in the generated videos. Despite the severity of this threat, existing safety benchmarks remain predominantly focused on text-based and content-only image-based jailbreaks, leaving implicit visual prompt attacks insufficiently explored. To bridge this gap, we present VVA-Bench, the first systematic benchmark for evaluating video generation safety under categorized vision-centric prompt attacks. Extensive experiments on VVA-Bench demonstrate that state-of-the-art models are highly susceptible to such attacks, with Attack Success Rates (ASR) reaching 100.0\% on Wan 2.7 and 74.8\% on Veo 3.1. To mitigate these risks, we propose VPA-Guard, a retrieval-augmented and self-evolving defense framework. By leveraging few-shot reasoning to identify latent malicious intents, our method reduces the attack ASR by 44.2\% and the harmfulness score by 73.4\% on average, while maintaining the model's utility for legitimate user edits. Our work provides both a rigorous benchmark and an effective defense strategy to advance safe and socially responsible multimodal generation.

We introduce a deep learning approach to realistically edit an sRGB image's white balance. Cameras capture sensor images that are rendered by their integrated signal processor (ISP) to a standard RGB (sRGB) color space encoding. The ISP rendering begins with a white-balance procedure that is used to remove the color cast of the scene's illumination. The ISP then applies a series of nonlinear color manipulations to enhance the visual quality of the final sRGB image. Recent work by [3] showed that sRGB images that were rendered with the incorrect white balance cannot be easily corrected due to the ISP's nonlinear rendering. The work in [3] proposed a k-nearest neighbor (KNN) solution based on tens of thousands of image pairs. We propose to solve this problem with a deep neural network (DNN) architecture trained in an end-to-end manner to learn the correct white balance. Our DNN maps an input image to two additional white-balance settings corresponding to indoor and outdoor illuminations. Our solution not only is more accurate than the KNN approach in terms of correcting a wrong white-balance setting but also provides the user the freedom to edit the white balance in the sRGB image to other illumination settings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) with safe-alignment training are powerful instruments with robust language comprehension capabilities. These models typically undergo meticulous alignment procedures involving human feedback to ensure the acceptance of safe inputs while rejecting harmful or unsafe ones. However, despite their massive scale and alignment efforts, LLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where malicious users manipulate the model to produce harmful outputs that it was explicitly trained to avoid. In this study, we find that the safety mechanisms in LLMs are predominantly embedded in the middle-to-late layers. Building on this insight, we introduce a novel white-box jailbreak method, SABER (Safety Alignment Bypass via Extra Residuals), which connects two intermediate layers s and e such that s < e, through a residual connection. Our approach achieves a 51% improvement over the best-performing baseline on the HarmBench test set. Furthermore, SABER induces only a marginal shift in perplexity when evaluated on the HarmBench validation set. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/PalGitts/SABER.

Computer Science education fundamentally depends on intensive laboratory hours to foster true programming mastery and logical reasoning. However, the widespread adoption of Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) has made it virtually impossible to distinguish authentic student effort from instant AI code synthesis by evaluating final submissions alone. To preserve pedagogical integrity, educators must enforce authentic coding discipline, guiding students through unassisted, iterative development cycles. While centralized environments like JupyterHub provide instructors with a platform to host and monitor the learning process step-by-step, they introduce severe operational vulnerabilities; because Jupyter environments inherently allow arbitrary shell command execution, they expose the underlying shared host to unauthorized system manipulation and lateral movement. This paper presents VISMATIC, a secure, low-cost framework designed to resolve this tension between process-oriented monitoring and infrastructure security. By pairing robust environment isolation with explicit user-interaction tracking at the API level, VISMATIC captures authentic programming behaviors without exposing the underlying host system. Evaluation from a pilot student cohort demonstrates that our macro-level behavioral metrics successfully flag statistical anomalies indicative of automated or off-platform workflows while preserving student anonymity, offering a scalable blueprint for safeguarding educational discipline in the AI era.

Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning interfaces, we introduce covert malicious finetuning, a method to compromise model safety via finetuning while evading detection. Our method constructs a malicious dataset where every individual datapoint appears innocuous, but finetuning on the dataset teaches the model to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. Applied to GPT-4, our method produces a finetuned model that acts on harmful instructions 99% of the time and avoids detection by defense mechanisms such as dataset inspection, safety evaluations, and input/output classifiers. Our findings question whether black-box finetuning access can be secured against sophisticated adversaries.

Recent agent benchmarks increasingly ground evaluation in executable environments, from code repair to web navigation, app APIs, and function calling. Yet completing consequential work beyond code requires more than producing a plausible response or valid tool call: agents must gather missing information over multiple turns, follow domain policies, coordinate dependent tools, and realize the correct persistent state transition without collateral effects. In this paper, we introduce Thinkingbox, a sandbox for tool-agent-user interaction that provides isolated MCP-compatible tool sessions, complete execution traces, and outcome evaluation over terminal backend state. Built on this sandbox, Thinkingbox-bench contains 507 policy-conditioned workflows across numerous scenarios, including retail, hospitality, auto insurance, neobank internal IT, and consulting IT/HR support. Each attempt is evaluated by task-specific executable checks that accept valid trajectories while rejecting wrong, missing, or extra effects; designated tasks additionally check required properties of the final response. Across proprietary and open-weight models, the strongest achieves 65.36% pass@1, but only 25.25% pass^20. Moreover, many failed trials show clean termination and valid state-changing actions, showing that response or tool-call-level signals are not clear proxies for end-to-end task completion. Thinkingbox-bench reveals a large gap between occasionally finding a successful trajectory and reliably completing stateful business tasks. We release both Thinkingbox and Thinkingbox-Bench: https://github.com/microsoft/thinkingbox

ASVspoof 2021 is the forth edition in the series of bi-annual challenges which aim to promote the study of spoofing and the design of countermeasures to protect automatic speaker verification systems from manipulation. In addition to a continued focus upon logical and physical access tasks in which there are a number of advances compared to previous editions, ASVspoof 2021 introduces a new task involving deepfake speech detection. This paper describes all three tasks, the new databases for each of them, the evaluation metrics, four challenge baselines, the evaluation platform and a summary of challenge results. Despite the introduction of channel and compression variability which compound the difficulty, results for the logical access and deepfake tasks are close to those from previous ASVspoof editions. Results for the physical access task show the difficulty in detecting attacks in real, variable physical spaces. With ASVspoof 2021 being the first edition for which participants were not provided with any matched training or development data and with this reflecting real conditions in which the nature of spoofed and deepfake speech can never be predicated with confidence, the results are extremely encouraging and demonstrate the substantial progress made in the field in recent years.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced natural language processing (NLP) with their impressive language understanding and generation capabilities. However, their performance may be suboptimal for domain-specific tasks that require specialized knowledge due to limited exposure to the related data. Additionally, the lack of transparency of most state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, which can only be accessed via APIs, impedes further fine-tuning with domain custom data. Moreover, providing private data to the LLMs' owner leads to data privacy problems. To address these challenges, we propose the novel Parametric Knowledge Guiding (PKG) framework, which equips LLMs with a knowledge-guiding module to access relevant knowledge without altering the LLMs' parameters. Our PKG is based on open-source "white-box" language models, allowing offline memory of any knowledge that LLMs require. We demonstrate that our PKG framework can enhance the performance of "black-box" LLMs on a range of domain knowledge-intensive tasks that require factual (+7.9%), tabular (+11.9%), medical (+3.0%), and multimodal (+8.1%) knowledge.